肥仔🎃

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动物凶猛

子飞鱼:

CHAPTER 1 Sex and the City


 


ALL狼/乱炖


现实衍生,情节虚构,请勿上升真人。


 


1.


我是朴佑镇,大韩民国某大型男子团体成员。直男。




这么说没别的意思,主要是被同性在床上抱着睡了一晚上怕被别人误会。


天地良心,我朴佑镇响当当好男儿,绝对没有和队友同睡一床的癖好。


 


裴珍映睡得正酣,紧紧抱着我的一只腿,脸在我腿根蹭着。他蹭着蹭着我就有点僵硬,再这样下去怕大事不好,心一横腿一蹬把他踹到床下。他立马醒了,我一看正好,解决了叫他起床的一大难题。


裴珍映有起床气,被闹醒了张牙舞爪扑上来掐我:


“哥我今晚不跟你一起睡了!”


 


2.


事情要从我们前天飞到香港开始说起。


我们去香港开演唱会,提前到了那儿,就一路不顺利,先是堵车后来被跟车的粉丝追上,慌慌忙忙到酒店每个人看起来都很狼狈,但登记的时候一人一张房卡让我立马喜上眉梢,精神饱满。


对于常年饱受集体宿舍生活折磨的人,出来一趟能住个单间可以被记录为生活里100件幸福的小事之一。


 


结果没想到我也就享受了一个晚上。


第二天我睡得正香就被人叫起来拽走开紧急会议,使劲睁眼睛醒了醒神,然后意识到所有人都挤在裴珍映的房间里,和我一样迷迷糊糊。他正在吃一根棒棒糖,脸颊一侧鼓鼓地,嘴巴舔得湿润。


一屋子人就在这看他舔棒棒糖。我刚想问他早上起来刷牙了没,他突然开口:


“我觉得半夜有人进来我房间。”


这句话听起来有点严重,我立马清醒了不少。


但是其他人好像不太信,在房间里东看看西看看。朴志训说你做梦呢吧,还扯了张纸巾递给他,“好好说话,然后呢。”


“后来我也不知道,床边好像有人影但是我就是醒不过来,感觉特别困。”裴珍映说话不清楚,颠三倒四说了一大堆,大概意思就是半夜好像听到开门的声音,没动静他又睡了,睡梦里隐约觉得有人在他身边。经纪人后来去查了监控也没用,他那个房间的位置刚好不太能被拍的到,而且那层不只我们住,谁进谁出了也不好找。


我听明白了,十有八九是私生饭,然后问他:“丢东西了没?你自己没什么事吧?”其实丢东西也不怕,就怕干出来别的事。


裴珍映突然脸红起来,他支支吾吾:“带过来的另一套睡衣找不到了。”


“是那个黑白格的吗?”黄旼炫问他。


他脸变得更红了,连耳朵也红的厉害,然后不好意思地嗯了一声。


可能是空调太足,空气冷却,连带着气氛也有些尴尬,我和朴志训看了彼此一眼,我们想得大概一样。私人物品里单拿走睡衣足够有暗示性。与肌肤相贴,暧昧不明。


裴珍映因为年龄小还长得好看,受到的这类骚扰的确更多。这不是第一次,但却是最严重的一次。


我为了缓解尴尬,下意识问了一句:“哥你怎么知道?”


问完我就后悔了,气氛反而更尴尬,朴志训向我投来一个看傻逼的眼神。


 


“我今晚还睡这里吗?”裴珍映小声问。他本身就有点胆小,最怕这种陌生的人和环境。搬家之前住的宿舍里浴室的灯总是坏,赖冠霖故意趁他摸黑洗澡的时候把门反锁上,怎么叫他也不开,任凭裴珍映在里面吓得直哭。现在也是,我能感受到他很害怕,眼角往下耷拉着,棒棒糖紧紧捏在手里。


 


我和赖冠霖一样爱捉弄他,我说:“你不要睡着,说不定今晚还会来,正好把那个人抓住,要是没人那昨晚的说不定就是鬼了。”


他被我的话吓住了,无助地看着我,我强忍着没有笑出来。


不过开玩笑归开玩笑,昨天晚上因为房间号里有个我不喜欢的数字和他换了房卡,要不然碰到这种事说不定就是我了。不是我迷信,事实证明数字4果然不吉利。


又或者那个人本来就是冲着他去的,连我俩换了房间都知道。总之我一时愧疚之情涌上心头,但又很想一个人住,心里挣扎了很久,最后义气占上风,我表情坚定眼神如矩地看着他,握住他的手:“没关系,哥陪你睡。”


而且我们团11个人,三分之一鼾声如雷,三分之一半夜不睡,也就我算作息正常无不良习惯了。


感天动地,可歌可泣,还没等到裴珍映被我感动到眼眶湿润,朴志训满脸嫌弃地上来掰开我俩的手,“差不多行了,恶心人。”


 


3.


这种事情听起来挺吓人,但发生也在预料之中。从草根变身当红偶像男团成员,上天入地也摆脱不了私生的追逐。往大了说私闯房间报警都不过分,往小了说这不过是出道以后的日常事故。


美其名曰“成名的代价”。


之前我还不知道私生是什么,姜丹尼尔向我生动解释:“我好像懂那种心情,我恨不得24小时都看着鲁尼,它拉屎我都觉得有意思。”


有病。


我白他一眼。他倒是想得开,照样能绕过粉丝在香港四处溜达。但我们大部分人都窝在酒店里闭门不出,连有人敲门都紧张兮兮。裴珍映不敢再去他那个房间,把自己东西都收拾了放在我的屋里。


 


我打游戏打得不亦乐乎,裴珍映下午睡醒了就无所事事,缠着我陪他出去玩。


他有股爱黏人的劲儿,我不搭理他就一直在旁边黏黏糊糊。被他烦得实在受不了,刚好姜丹尼尔在聊天室里说要去酒店的泳池游泳,我赶紧把裴珍映打发给他。


 


十分钟以后姜丹尼尔来敲我的房门的时候裴珍映正好在换泳衣,赖冠霖也很跟着一起过来了。裴珍映已经脱了上衣,看到人来用被子裹住自己。


我催他:“没外人,你快点换。”


“你们扭过去不要看。”


赖冠霖笑他笑得毫不留情,“有什么不能看的,哥怎么像个小姑娘。”


这话说得挺流氓,尤其对着一张漂亮脸,说出来总带几分旖旎的意思。赖冠霖不是什么乖小孩,他性格里有种恶劣因子,在惹怒裴珍映这件事上格外有禀赋。裴珍映嘴笨说不过他,被气得脸红也拿他没办法。


 


裴珍映扭过身子,把被子掀开,露出来纤细的上半身。他的身型瘦弱,骨骼关节清晰地显现出来,从我这个角度看的是他的侧面,微微凸起的锁骨和背后的蝴蝶骨显得整个人脆弱易折。


实在没有什么看头,但也比一般男人五大三粗的身材顺眼很多。


一换好泳衣,姜丹尼尔就对着他拍了一张照片。裴珍映立马就冲过去抢他手机,他们俩身高差着一截,姜丹尼尔把手机举过头顶裴珍映就够不着。


但他打定主意要删了那张照片,于是把姜丹尼尔推倒在床上去抓他的手机,结果裴珍映力气小被姜丹尼尔反压到床上,两个人一来一去就在我床上滚作一团。我看着实在不成样子把他们揪起来,连带着赖冠霖一起赶出门去。


 


搞基也不要在我的床上搞。


 


 


4.


等他们走了我就开始睡觉,被饿醒的时候已经十点多了,裴珍映还没回来。


给他打电话也关机了,我心里有点发毛,怕他出什么事,但告诉经纪人了他回来肯定会挨一顿骂。


我没办法,就先在我们的聊天室里问,结果只有几个人回我,都说没和他一块儿。


[尹智圣:不是和丹尼尔冠霖去游泳了吗?]


[赖冠霖:我们七点多就回来了]


[尹智圣:… â€¦å§œä¸¹å°¼å°”呢?怎么不回消息…]


… â€¦


 


朴志训和姜丹尼尔都没回我,打电话也没人接,估计这会儿正在打游戏。


他们俩玩起游戏来不要命,全神贯注,别说听不见电话铃声,我在门口放个炮也未必能听见。


无奈我只能一个个去找他们。还没出门,黄旼炫就来找我。


我正好问他:“哥,珍映是不是在你那。”


“没有,电话也打不通。”


我心想完了,实在想不到他还能去哪:“不会真的碰到变态私生了吧?”


“别胡说。”他拍了我一下,但很显然他也不能笃定。


 


我跟黄旼炫先去找朴志训。


我猜的不错,他果真正摸黑打游戏,我们来了才开灯,然后继续激情作战,根本没空理我们。边敲鼠标边骂骂咧咧,十有八九是在骂姜丹尼尔。


打游戏打得正欢的人都不能惹,他们俩还十分暴力,所以很少在一间屋子里打游戏,怕伤人伤己。


 


我四处看了看,裴珍映也不在他这里。


我纳闷:“那裴珍映也没来找过你?”


“没。”


“那他能去哪呢。”


他终于把眼睛从屏幕上移开:“找不到他了?”


我心说朴志训挺厉害的一下午了也没看手机。


“哥也不知道吗?”他看着黄旼炫说。


我又纳闷了:“为什么问旼炫哥?”


朴志训又是看傻逼的眼神看我。


 


我和黄旼炫又一起去找姜丹尼尔,估计他是最后一个见到裴珍映的人。


他穿着睡衣给我们开门,头发乱糟糟,我以为他在睡觉,结果看到电脑屏幕亮着。


他斜靠在玄关的墙上,声音沙哑的问:“怎么了?”


“哥在打游戏吗?”


“嗯。”


“见珍映了吗?找不到他了。”


他说游完泳就各自回房间了,和赖冠霖说得一样。


“你们还没跟经纪人说吧?”姜丹尼尔声音压低问。


我摇摇头,我们在这点上都很有默契。


“再等一等,实在不行再说。”黄旼炫往玄关往房间里看了一眼,我顺着他的眼神看,一堆衣服堆在床上,估计他的洁癖又犯了。


 


我和黄旼炫回到房间又等了半个小时,裴珍映终于回来了。


他穿着很大号的T恤和短裤,头发乱蓬蓬的,脸颊发红。


我拽着他的手腕把他拉进房间里,“你去哪了?”


“我找冠霖玩了。”


“放屁,”我骂道,“不是七点多就回来了吗,你到底去哪疯了?”


黄旼炫也在旁边一言不发地盯着他看,他生气的时候很吓人,不说话抿住嘴,连我也不敢再吭声。裴珍映不会撒谎,说谎话的时候眼神乱飘,被我们看得耳根发红:“我自己出去逛了。”


我看着他衣服上印的GUCCI字母:“衣服在哪换的?”


“冠霖的,我洗过澡本来想回来。又觉得无聊就出去逛了逛。”他这个时候不心虚了,眨巴着眼直愣愣看我。


我被他看得有点不好意思,不过还是不太信,他做贼一样偷偷摸摸。我去看黄旼炫脸色,他好像更生气了,一只手撑着桌子,手臂上肌肉的线条显出来,下颌的肌肉也紧绷着。以前他没健身的时候我觉得他顶多就唠叨两句,现在感觉下一秒就要挥拳头打人。


我猜他和我生气的原因不一样。


他在队里做主做惯了,我们几个小的平常有点什么事他全知道,裴珍映不听话让他觉得难堪。


 


反正黄旼炫说什么也不让裴珍映再睡我这了。


“你们两个一起就只能闯祸。”


我打心眼里冤,我安安生生呆着裴珍映自己跑出去还能怪我。


黄旼炫拉着他就往外走,我问:“哥你回去不会要打他吧?”我有点幸灾乐祸,“想打就打吧,打一顿就好了。”


裴珍映就是被惯的。


把他们俩送走我总算清静了,但又总觉得奇奇怪怪的。


 


半夜我被噩梦惊醒,终于想起来哪里不对了。


姜丹尼尔房间的床上有一件白T,上面有GUCCI的字母。


 


5.


后来的几天裴珍映就是在黄旼炫的房间睡的。虽然乱七八糟的事情终于平息,但好多疑问像一团乌云压在我心里,沉甸甸的。


我的好奇心终于被激发起来,除了困惑,隐隐之间还有些兴奋,揭开秘密的过程也让我尝到了乐趣。


 


在香港的最后一天晚上,赖冠霖带着我们几个人去逛夜市。裴珍映懒得出门,发个短信让我带夜宵给他。


我们玩的晚十一点多才回酒店。我拎着买的鱼蛋去敲黄旼炫的门。


他俩看上去已经要睡了,只开着床头灯。裴珍映整个都缩在被子里,只露出小小的一张脸来,整个人蔫蔫的。


“生病了吗?”


黄旼炫叉了一颗鱼蛋喂到裴珍映嘴里:“珍映有点感冒。”


裴珍映边嚼边摆出楚楚可怜的表情。灯光昏暗我看不真切,他好像弯着眼睛冲我狡黠地笑了一下。


我有种错觉,我被这个外表纯良、比我还小一岁的人耍了。


“那我回去了。”


“把门带好,小心外面的粉丝。”


 


内心的好奇心又熊熊燃烧起来。


我觉得秘密近在眼前,决定碰碰运气。我碰了一下门假装已经出去了,然后躲在玄关的鞋柜旁边。从我这个角度只能看到床尾,不能算偷窥,顶多是偷听。


我皮肤黑,但是心不黑。这种事很不道德,而且显得我格外猥琐,有失身份,搁到以前打死也做不出来。


单身群居生活果然逼得人疯魔。


                                                                                                          


“佑镇哥走啦?”


“嗯,你还吃不吃了?”


“哥哥再喂我一个。不要用叉子,用嘴巴。”


虽然他们看不见,但我还是用力翻了个白眼。


 


大概过了十几分钟,床头灯也关了,屋子里漆黑寂静,只有微弱的月光透过窗帘洒到地上。


这下真变成偷听了。


但我被淹没在黑暗里,没人说话,我突然不知道自己躲在这里的意义。


更何况我并不期待听得到什么。


 


就在我快要放弃,准备拧开门把手时,我听到了一阵的窸窸窣窣的布料摩擦声。紧接着逐渐加重的呼吸声传到我耳朵里。我起了一身鸡皮疙瘩,全身的汗毛都竖起来。


两人的喘息声和床上的动静越来越大。我咬住自己手臂才不让自己发出声音。肌肤相亲时轻微的响动都在房间里无限放大。我以我一个移动硬盘的小电影起誓,再逼真的镜头也不如真实场景来的刺激。


突然裴珍映痛苦地叫了一声,“哥哥...好疼。”他颤着音,然后发出一连串黏糊又轻微的哭声。


我现在精神高度紧张,偷听的羞耻感烧得我耳朵发烫。黑暗里我的视觉无济于事,听觉变得格外灵敏。一连串色情的声音从耳朵里传到大脑皮层,刺激着我的神经,连带着我也有一种强烈的背德感。


我自己怕再多待一刻都会崩溃,我左手掐着自己的脸尽量冷静下来,右手握住门把手,轻轻转动。


“哥哥…我觉得有人。”


“没有,放松,别害怕。”


三。


断断续续变了调的哼声继续敲打着我的鼓膜。


二。


“珍映…珍映…”


一。


我落荒而逃。


 


6. 


第二天我们终于离开了香港。


我因为所见所闻,心里受到了刺激,精神也有些恍惚,在飞机上恹恹不乐。


朴志训在我边上玩手机:“你怎么了。”


“没事,你是Gay吗?”我紧张兮兮地问他。


他现在估计已经把我当神经病:“我看起很像吗?”


“你不像,有人像。”


朴志训好像突然来了兴致:“当gay有意思吗?能比打游戏还有意思?”


我惊讶于他把这两件事情作类比。我瞥一眼他的手机,他正跟姜丹尼尔聊游戏。


果然不是gay,只是一个张口闭口都是游戏的直男。


“那天晚上你们打游戏谁赢了?”


“哪天?”


“我去找你问珍映在哪那天。”


“我没跟他一起打啊,”朴志训有点莫名其妙,“他根本没上线。”


“… â€¦å½“时你怎么不说?”


“你又没问。”


我突然有点烦躁:“那他不是在打游戏是在干嘛?”


“你跟我急个屁,想知道自己去问。”


他当时可能根本没在打游戏,那为什么要撒谎呢。


我一点一点把所有的细枝末节联系起来,白色T恤,黄旼炫反常的愤怒,和裴珍映消失的三个多小时。


“所以说他那天… â€¦â€æˆ‘恍然大悟。


被惊人的事实冲击得我说不出下半句话。我愣愣地看着朴志训,他好像知道我要说什么,一脸讳莫如深,先我一步开口:“闭嘴,这么多人呢”。


 


现在的我总算明白了一个道理:可能吃鸡和搞基本质是一样的,都是要战胜男人或者输给男人。


只不过一个是心理上,一个是生理上。


姜丹尼尔天生爱寻求刺激,试图在两者上都得到快乐。


 


 


7.


保姆车开到宿舍楼下我就迫不及待跳下车去搬我的行李。


我说服自己到家以后一切都应该回到正轨,疯狂的回忆从我踏上首尔的土地开始就应该抛在脑后。


我们的行李箱从车上搬下来堆在一起。有两只箱子看起来破破烂烂,马上就要报废,一个是金在奂的一个是赖冠霖的。赖冠霖的那个箱子拉链被撑开,我赶忙把他的箱子放倒,结果里面的东西还是露出来一点。


我看到一件眼熟的衣服。


黑白格子。很像睡衣的样式。


 


“冠霖你箱子该换了。”我提醒他。


“下次出门就换。”赖冠霖笑了笑,把棒球帽的帽檐掀起来,专门露出来眼睛看了我一眼,然后不慌不忙把箱子拎走。


 


我站在太阳地里,光线毒辣,眼前一阵阵发黑,香港之行的种种细节又开始在我脑袋里打转。


“不搬行李愣着干嘛呢。”朴志训拍了我一下。


我拽住他:“你说的没错。”


“什么?”


“我真的是个傻逼。”


 


 


天气炎热,欲望赤裸,动物凶猛。


 


PS:


我的自我介绍果然十分睿智。


大家好,我是朴佑镇。我是直男。


 


FIN./TBC .



【正贾正】歪打正着

我在流泪

甜度7%:

朱正廷x黄明昊








请勿上升真人。


队友出没注意。


现背,时间轴在乐华团体出道后。


室友设定。


短打小甜饼,一发完。


ooc算我的,避雷食用。






脑洞来源:


不知道之前有没有人写过qwq












01




是难得轻松,不用黑白颠倒地赶行程的一天。


几个人享受着来之不易的假期,在宿舍里睡得天昏地暗。


等到全部人都醒过来的时候已几近黄昏,七个人抱着饥肠辘辘的肚子坐在客厅的沙发上大眼瞪小眼地发呆。




期间不知道是谁提出来的要玩国王游戏,输的人要请客下馆子吃饭。




本来个个都是蔫儿了吧唧的没精打采,听到‘请客’两个字时眼睛里都发着光,连抽扑克牌的时候都是小心翼翼地合掌祈祷。




拜托拜托,保佑我的钱包平安。




最后主导权落在了范丞丞手上,那人把Joker牌面的纸牌向众人展示时还带着一声怪笑。


“哈,我是国王诶。”




他捏着纸牌,眼神在剩余的六个人里快速地转了一圈。


“一号和七号,七号对一号说我爱你,一号说再来一遍,要是谁先害羞进行不下去了,谁就输了。”范丞丞脑袋瓜子一转,又补充道,“七号的我爱你必须要说得有感情,可以运用肢体动作。”




话音刚落,对面坐着的黄新淳和丁泽仁上一秒还在皱着脸闭着眼睛祈祷,下一秒便像赢了世界杯一般地欢呼起来,旁边的毕雯珺和李权哲把牌一翻,也跟着加入到欢呼的队伍之中。




坐在最边上的朱正廷笑着摇头,把手中的纸牌放到桌上,牌面上的数字是7。


他有点庆幸自己是说我爱你的那一方。




那么1就是——




只见黄明昊把牌面是数字1的纸牌压着缓缓往前推的时候,脸上是不曾见过的悲壮。




那边两个人还在看天望地地做最后的准备,这边看好戏的五个人已经围成一团,甚至在范丞丞的带领下下起了赌注。


“压一块,正正哥会输。”


其余四个人的情况是跟注。








“我爱你。”




朱正廷突然认真的神色把黄明昊吓了一跳,他故意压低了些的声线带了几分深情,变成一道电流窜过黄明昊的心头。


他耳根蓦地开始发热:“再来一遍。”




被押注会输的朱正廷此刻却看起来十分地游刃有余。他嘴角勾起一个弧度,眼波温柔地看向黄明昊,字正腔圆道:“我爱你。”




旁边的五个人似乎是没料到平日里的老干部朱正廷会有如此的表现,纷纷倒吸一口凉气。




黄明昊从对上他视线的那一刻心底就已经开始发慌了,奈何又不能躲,只好硬着头皮一直与那双柔情似水的双眼对视着,却不曾想听见那三个字时差点呼吸一窒。


他不着痕迹地收拾了一下慌张的情绪,把手心里冒出的冷汗蹭到裤子上。


“再来一遍……”




朱正廷看着他笑开来,往前走了两步直接站到黄明昊面前,伸手把他的手拉起来,掌心贴着变成十指交扣。


“我爱你。”




气氛忽然就变得微妙起来。




一旁的范丞丞看着两个人为了游戏输赢而认真到极致的模样莫名地觉得好笑,眼看着憋笑就要憋不住,被手疾眼快的毕雯珺捂住了嘴。




黄明昊浑身僵直,看着近在咫尺的脸恍惚了,机灵脑袋在此刻完全派不上用场,甚至还冒着烟地当机了。


他的耳根正以光速烧起来,连带着颈脖一片都开始发烫。他因为紧张而发凉的手正贴着朱正廷温热的掌心,左边胸腔里的那颗心脏砰砰直跳,响在耳边如擂战鼓。


游戏而已,游戏而已。


他企图这样去安慰抚平自己悸动的心,却毫无用处,然后他不大自然地把手抽回来。


“好了好了,不就是请客嘛,我请就是了,”黄明昊转过身,欲盖弥彰,“再这么下去我们能饿死。”




结果就是莫名的尴尬。




黄明昊一开始挨着范丞丞落座,朱正廷在他身边坐下的时候他却找了个蹩脚的理由,和坐在对面的丁泽仁换了座。




旁边的人吃得津津有味,黄明昊饭菜入口却无滋无味。




无聊间接范丞丞的话时一不小心便和对面的朱正廷目光相撞,尴尬得他咬着筷子不知如何是好,他故作淡定地把视线挪到桌上还冒着香气的菜上,夹菜的筷子偏偏还和朱正廷的撞到一起。




一整顿饭下来,黄明昊没吃多少东西,心口是憋满了闷气,恨不得去敲罪魁祸首两锤子。




明知是游戏却还当真地听了进去,真是傻得不行。








02




朱正廷觉得黄明昊最近不大正常。


但他也无法准确地说出是哪里不对。




如果说以前黄明昊总是爱对他张牙舞爪地发脾气耍赖,那现在的黄明昊在他面前就是一副乖顺听话的模样;如果说以前的黄明昊总是喜欢把和他斗嘴作为日常的乐趣,那现在的黄明昊就是抱着那块名为惜字的金子。


而这一切都是在似有若无地减少着和朱正廷的接触。


虽然黄明昊表现得并不明显,但朱正廷毕竟心思比较细腻,感受得到他的疏离。




朱正廷对黄明昊突然的变化感到奇怪,想不通。


直到这天深夜,他从练习室回到宿舍,其他人已经睡熟了。他像往常一样摸黑去确认每个人的情况,踢了被子的给掖好,姿势不对的给摆正。


回到自己房间的时候,发现另一张床上打呼噜打得震天响的人,不知什么时候被自己传染去了说梦话的习惯,嘟嘟囔囔地说着什么。


朱正廷觉得好玩,蹑手蹑脚地在他的床边蹲下。黄明昊的睡姿并不太美观,被子也被他踢到腰部以下的位置。


他正要帮黄明昊把被子提起来,就听见黄明昊的梦呓:“朱正廷你别说了,我爱你,我也爱你。”




一句话说得断断续续,朱正廷听得明明白白。




人一般在两种情况下容易说出心头所想的真话。一种是喝醉之后,一种是毫无防备和意识之时。




那一瞬间,朱正廷懂得了一切变化的矛头,皆指向于几天前的那个游戏,也懂得了那天游戏过后黄明昊的古怪。


也是那一瞬间,心里悄无声息成长起来的那棵大树,粉粉嫩嫩地把花开满了枝桠。




朱正廷心尖上都像是被浇过蜜一样甜。他宠溺地笑笑,轻柔地抬手抚上黄明昊柔软的头毛。


“傻瓜呀。”










隔天的画报拍摄,朱正廷的顺序是最后一个。


结束拍摄时,摄影棚里的电子时钟上的头两个数字已经跳到了01。


已是深冬季节,温度也跟着时间往深夜的走动在往下掉。


他匆匆卸了妆,换上日常的衣服,哆嗦着钻进了保姆车里。




朱正廷在最后一排揪到在打盹的黄明昊,整个人像个小孩一样缩在柔软的羽绒服里,保姆车里的暖黄色灯光把他照得十分的柔和。


他有些赌气地在小孩儿旁边坐下。今天的黄明昊也在躲他。


但他无意吵醒黄明昊,当他再次转过头时,那人已经揉着眼睛慢悠悠地坐直身子看着他。




“拍摄完了吗?”




小孩儿的声音里还带着刚睡醒的软糯。




“嗯。”




黄明昊哦了一声,把挂在脖子上的耳机塞到耳朵里,开始自我隔绝。




车里再度陷入了沉默的安静之中。


回宿舍的路途有点漫长,如果不是车窗外一闪而过的路灯和前排正和范丞丞一起打游戏的毕雯珺时不时的低语,朱正廷差点以为时间也陷入了被沉默的静止状态。


身旁的人一动不动,只留个后脑勺对着他。


他知道,黄明昊并没有睡着。




朱正廷伸手去扯掉他右边耳朵里的那只耳机,果不其然小孩儿转过头来看他,眼里是询问的意思。




“陪我说会儿话吧。”




“嗯……说什么?”




朱正廷忖度着要不要跟小孩儿说实话,前排说话的音量一下拔高了起来。




“范丞丞!你怎么骗我!说谎还不带心虚的!我真的信了!”




“你以为我是正正哥,说个谎还要脸红啊?”




黄明昊眨巴着眼睛,等了朱正廷半天没等到他开口,正打算缩回去继续自我隔绝,搭在大腿上的手一下被朱正廷握住。


朱正廷的手还没有完全暖和起来,带着凉意地把他的手包裹住。




“明昊。”




“嗯?”




黄明昊特别害怕突然认真起来的朱正廷,害怕那种天旋地转的感觉又找上门来。




“我真的很不会说谎吗?”




朱正廷没头没脑地问这么一句,差点把黄明昊给问懵了。


他想了一下刚刚范丞丞和毕雯珺的对话,慢慢地点了点头:“是啊,哥说谎的时候很容易脸红,还容易结巴。”




“那你为什么觉得我那天只是单纯地在做游戏呢?”




……




黄明昊想逃了。




他想把手收回来,却被朱正廷牢牢地抓住,没办法后退,也没办法逃。


平时和朱正廷嘻嘻哈哈惯了,他也缺少和朱正廷像现在这样对话的勇气。


黄明昊扭过头去,假装在看窗外的风景:“哥说什么呢……”




“我说,我那天没有在说谎,因为没有说谎,才说得那么好。”




前排的争论还在继续,朱正廷的话说得很轻,但黄明昊还是清清楚楚地听到了。


不可思议和欢欣各掺一半地环绕在心头。黄明昊把头转回来,车子刚好在路灯下停着等红绿灯,他正好可以看见朱正廷眼里是前所未有的深情和认真。




可他还是想耍赖。




“我音乐开太大声了没听见……你说什么?”




其实耳机里一直没有音乐。


朱正廷早看到了他手里的手机并没有连着耳机线。


他顺水推舟,轻笑着凑到黄明昊又开始发烫的耳边,柔声道:“我说,我爱你。”




“再说一遍。”




黄明昊的眼睛亮晶晶的,像落满了整个银河系的星星。


朱正廷又凑近了一些,那只空闲的手捂住他的眼睛。




有些事情,星星可以不用知道。


就当这次是他输了吧。




他瞒着星星,悄悄地,又小心翼翼地吻上黄明昊,贴着那人的嘴唇一字一字无声道:“我,爱,你。”




我爱你。








FIN♡


感谢观看。

旼狼/ 新年快乐

InsideHeartness:


是个<当你>的流水账番外篇,有时间可能还会续写一点

写的有点匆忙,所以嗯不是很好……不要深究啦,就是拼凑的小甜饼

大家都新年快乐❤️



—————————————————


他们新年是在日本过的,年前两人正是蜜里调油的时候,奈何公司越近年关越忙的一塌糊涂,黄旼炫也就小年夜安稳坐下和他吃了个饭,之后恨不得连个人影都没有。
裴珍映心里忐忑忑的,往年他看到机票前都不知道自己在哪过年,黄旼炫全部安排妥帖,头等舱五星宾馆米其林餐厅三连,个个都是当地最好的,不过总让人有点憋闷。
他和黄旼炫间不再隔阂之后,这些事也都断断续续讲开了。其实裴珍映早没放在心上,他一旦知道对方也是真的怀抱着和自己同样的心情,以前种种委屈都变成细碎的糖粒。但黄旼炫不知道出于什么心思,早早把这次的过年计划全权交给了他。
裴珍映放了假闲在家里,用了百分之八百零九的心来规划,颇有种农奴翻身做地主的感觉,还是挖空了心思要做个好地主的那种地主。
这着实不是件太容易的事情,要是走黄旼炫的路线一切按最好的来也就罢了,他铆足了劲想让这趟旅程开心又难忘,自然要多做功课。在一起这几年时间说短也不短了,裴珍映总归是模模糊糊知道他各方面喜好的,但整个一套订完之后到底想让人看看——反正也不是给什么惊喜,所有钱都是从人家帐上划的,还是要两个人都合心意才好。
然而黄旼炫哪里有时间,裴珍映二八晚上还撑着想等他回来问问,结果醒的时候就到了第二天大早上,被黄旼炫胡乱扣在怀里睡成一团。
飞机是当天下午的,他没有选择黄旼炫往年偏爱的欧洲城市,飞行时间自然也没从前那么长,于是就心安理得在人胸口蹭了蹭,懒洋洋泡在温暖的冬日阳光里。
好在黄旼炫生物钟足够牢固,才在中午前把他挖了起来。睡回笼觉的裴珍映比往常还不容易醒,赖在床上迷迷糊糊叽里咕噜。
黄旼炫是彻底拿这小家伙没辙,最后一个公主抱连人带被子直接捞进卫生间,热毛巾擦脸擦了一半,裴珍映那还在梦里神游太空的脑子才总算溜达回来,红着脸挣扎下来被被子拌了一跤,一点不差的又跌回人怀里。
黄旼炫笑着把他扶稳,忍不住似的亲了一下又一下。
“我自己来先先先洗漱我自己自己自己来!”
裴珍映深深觉得再这样下去早餐的煎蛋可以在自己脸上做了。黄旼炫先去收拾行李,他一个人站在明亮亮的镜子前头,脑子里全是刚才迷蒙中看到的,黄旼炫那几乎要流出蜜糖的眼神。


旅途顺利,不过还是深夜才到住处。这位于市郊的小独栋别墅,房主是个漂亮精致的日本少妇,裴珍映韩语都说的不太顺溜,英语更有点颠三倒四,接过钥匙感谢她的时候一个词一个词的蹦。黄旼炫拖着箱子装隐形人,被小孩转过来呲牙咧嘴扯袖口才轻咳一声,用流利的日语和对方交谈起来。
“你们……刚才说了什么啊。”裴珍映向来知道这人脑子好得不得了,总时不常冒出点新技能来,还都是满点的,会说个日语不算什么,说的跟本地人没差别……当然也不算什么了。
不过那女士边说边看着他们两个微笑,那微笑里总有一点说不清道不明的感觉,弄的裴珍映百爪挠心的好奇。
黄旼炫早看到他快要化为实质矗立头顶的问号了,一张脸憋笑憋的丁点精英气质都不剩:“就说很感谢她,新年顺利这些啊。”
不用看就知道没说实话。
“先生绝对是狐狸转世而且还是上辈子专门骗小孩子的那种狐狸。”他碎碎念的吐槽一串,连气都不带换。
对方一点不恼,逗猫似的曲起手指刮他下巴,裴珍映开始还皱着脸,没有十秒就破了功忍不住笑。黄旼炫的吻落在他嘴角,他也勾着对方脖子回吻过去。
这种事情一旦起了头就是停不下来的,接吻无论多少次都让人缺氧。卧室里圆形大床又宽又软,黄旼炫温柔占有他,情/////欲的波涛一浪一浪涌来。
裴珍映仰头的时候看到了落地窗外的月亮,时间大概过了零点,那月亮带着异国清冷的光,黄旼炫凑上来用牙尖舔吻他小巧的喉结。
“珍映啊,怎么办,要多爱你才够呢?”
裴珍映已然说不出完整的话,他摇头,生理泪水沿着耳廓滴到床单上。


除夕的安排为着这意料之中的小插曲留出了余地,到达晴空塔的时候正好黄昏。旧历年最后的落日是极暖的橙金色,四面通透的旋转餐厅被尽数沁染。这餐食的仪式感远大于味道,说实话裴珍映也吃不出它和往年那些极昂贵繁复的食物有多么天差地别,但心情确实大有不同。
从落地玻璃望出去,整个东京尽收眼底,夜幕渐渐低垂,星星近得触手可及。裴珍映正把自己塞得像个脸颊鼓鼓的小仓鼠,就见黄旼炫端着茶杯伸手过来,和他的轻轻一碰。
“嗯?”他是很少和他碰杯的。
“明年也要这样,”黄旼炫顿了一下,补充道,“团团圆圆。”

虽然裴珍映执着于过年的氛围,花了整个下午布置别墅,但他们并没有回去。深夜的广场依旧熙熙攘攘,聚集着等待浅草寺的新年钟声,有小孩坐在父亲的肩膀上,手舞足蹈的挥着发光气球。裴珍映笑着拉黄旼炫看,冷不防一个晃神,自己也被架了上去。
“先生放我下来啊,”黄旼炫个子高,裴珍映往他肩上一摞,更是高的鹤立鸡群,他从没有被这样对待过,不敢大幅度挣扎,俯下身往黄旼炫耳边凑,“我很沉的坐肩膀的都是小孩子……”
“没事,珍映也是小孩子,”黄旼炫扶着他的脚腕,嘘了一声,“还有几分钟,安心。”
裴珍映手都不知道往哪里搁,无措的抓着他的大衣领子。黄旼炫手指摩挲着他的腕骨。
一年前……怎么也想不到会这样过年啊。

钟声就在他的胡思乱想间响起了。
黄旼炫抬头说了句什么,被嘈杂的人声淹没。裴珍映急切的低下头去,迎接他的是一个吻。
在异国他乡的千人广场上,和着新年的钟声,明目张胆,毫不隐藏到张扬的地步。
唇分的时候108遍钟声已经接近结尾,裴珍映微微有点喘,黄旼炫矮身把他放下,他大声的问:“第一声钟响的时候,先生说了什么?”
“愛してる”黄旼炫如实回答,嘴角停留在一个上翘的弧度,“我说,我爱你。”
最后一声悠长的钟声敲响在他的尾音里,几乎像是一锤定音。繁华高楼林立的城市里烟花盛放,非常短暂、非常世俗的璀璨。
完蛋了。
裴珍映有一瞬间绝望的想,这么爱一个人也是可以的吗,超越银座大楼,超越晴空塔,超越烟花盛放时最高的那颗火星,就算这样还觉得不够。
“新年快乐,”然而他什么也没有说,就静静望着黄旼炫的眼睛,“先生,新年快乐。”
“新年快乐,”黄旼炫摸摸他的头,整理好他被吹乱的额发,“烟花很美。”
“你没看呀…”
“在你眼里。”


tbc


【旼狼】第十一次飞行 (一发完)

真滴好看

WATERLILY:



*主要人物死亡预警


但是是HE !真的是HE!我发誓是HE!


(想了一下还是写完一起发了 æ˜¨å¤©ç‚¹å°çº¢å¿ƒçš„盆友们抱歉啦


正文


↓↓↓


【一】
这是裴珍映的第十一次单独飞行



年轻的死神先生悠闲自在地坐在头等舱座位里,拿着一杯低度果酒微微摇晃,这些年科技发展了,经济水平提高了,人民富起来了,最重要的是,他经过几世的历练上百年的勤恳工作,终于从实习死神变成了在编人士,裴珍映抿了口酒,梅子混合青柠的味道在嘴里蔓延开来,他拍拍胸口处被外套遮掩住的工作证:我骄傲!



飞机的乘客慢慢上来了,裴珍映把座位入口的滑动门打开一点,饶有兴趣地看着神色各异的人拎着大包小包往机舱深处鱼贯而去,他想起自己还跟着师傅学习的时候,前一任抠门所长连身西装都不给实习生发,出个外务还得挤经济舱,他穿着师傅给的旧牛仔,里衬是还是人类的时候穿着的粉色连帽卫衣,傻乎乎地跟在师傅旁边,偏偏那天要带走的人是个泼皮,他和师傅费了九牛二虎之力才把人交到事务所,回去的时候夜已深了,他从口袋里把从飞机上带下来的小面包拿出来委屈巴巴地啃,面包又凉又干,一个不小心就梗在喉咙里,噎得他直翻白眼,裴珍映越想越委屈,把还剩一半的面包往地下一扔:“什么破差事!我不干了!”



“你有的选吗”
西装已经皱巴巴的死神师傅递给他一瓶矿泉水
“小裴啊,慢慢适应吧,毕竟回不去啦”



裴珍映呆呆地把水接过来,嘴角还带着面包屑,他低头看看自己已经快看不出来是嫩粉色的连帽卫衣,衣服的下摆沾染了颜色深浅不一的大片血迹
是啊,回不去了,毕竟,他已经不是个人了啊 


 


 


飞机上的人愈来愈多起来,裴珍映甩甩脑袋,把不多的果酒一口饮尽,再把座位上的毛毯展开,准备休息一下。仁川到纽约有十多个小时的机程,虽然这架飞机开不到终点,但留给他补几个小时觉的时间还是有的,况且今天的情况比较特殊,长时间的纠缠在所难免,根据《有效解决恋世一百招》的指导,养个精蓄个锐绝对有必要


 


 


裴珍映抬起手腕,表盘上显示的时间已经接近起飞时间了,但是飞机一点滑行的意思都没有,机舱里坐的满满当当,孩童的哭闹声和中年男人的高谈论阔交织着,其中也不乏向机组人员询问为何还不出发的抱怨声


 


 


怎么从一出发就不顺利吗,那还真是,命中注定啊


 


 


“抱歉因为现在还有乘客没有上机,地面广播已经在催促了,等到限定时间如果还没有来的话会起航的”


 


 


好脾气的空姐耐心地和不耐烦的乘客解释着,裴珍映轻蔑地用鼻子吭了口气,耽误别人时间的人反而可能因此逃过一劫,这什么世道


 


 


他把滑动门关上,往毯子里缩了一缩,阳光从没有遮光板遮挡的小小玻璃里穿过,他也好像不过是在冬日太阳下贪懒的猫罢了


 


 


然而刚刚关上的门下一瞬又被打开了,来人一边还转着身和空姐说着抱歉,一边踏入原本只有裴珍映一人的小小天地,裴珍映刚刚闭起的眼睛因为这动静又唰得一下睁开,等到来人转过头来,带着歉意的笑容跟他道了一句不好意思,裴珍映原本还轱辘轱辘转的眼球猛地一下子停住了,面前的人又说了一句不好意思,用手指示意自己要进裴珍映里面的座位,裴珍映半点没挪动,感觉自己看不清也听不到,倒是大脑好像传来“BIU”的一声----彻底死机了


 


 


【二】


裴珍映拥有还是人类时的记忆


 


 


那是他的第一次单独飞行


 


 


机翼和地面摩擦发出巨大响声的时候,他被抛离座位又被牵引的安全带扯回去的时候,大脑被撞击后传来剧烈却短暂的疼痛的时候,那些时候,裴珍映已经看不到眼前有什么了,他努力地把眼睛睁开睁大,但是什么也看不到,脑子里绷住的最后一根弦也慢慢断了,他迷迷糊糊地想,今生就这样结束了吧,作为idol裴珍映的人生,到这里就是终点了吧,下一次醒来会是什么身份什么角色呢,或者,他是不是再也不会醒来了?化作一片羽毛、一粒尘埃、一缕烟,飘向宇宙深处,就这样永永远远地消失了?


 


 


说不上来好还是不好,他没有成为一片羽毛、一粒尘埃、一缕烟,等到再一次睁开眼睛的时候,他还是有胳膊有脚,记得自己姓裴名珍映,记得他的组合要为了最后一次专辑封面的拍摄去到遥远的大洋彼岸,也记得自己因为要客串电视剧拍摄而晚一天单独出发,然而身体上强烈的疼痛已经消失了,衣服上的血迹和旁边破碎的飞机遗骸也在提醒他,一场意料之外且不可挽回的事故确实发生了


 


 


裴珍映不知所措地站在机骸旁,突然想起来他结束昏三倒四的当日拍摄,从短暂却深度的睡眠中醒来,穿着卡通睡衣站在暖烘烘的宿舍门口送提前出发的成员们离开的时候,成员们一个个和他告别,他懵懵的只是站着,无意识地挥手,带着黏糊糊的鼻音说着“嗯哥再见”,“一路顺利啊哥”,“嗯嗯后天见!”


 


 


队伍末尾的人揉揉他的脑袋跟他说了再见,在他要关门的时候却又折返了回来,他被带进一个稍微沾染了点儿凉意的怀抱里,那人的行李箱因为惯性轻轻的滑向门外,裴珍映下意识地伸手想拉,下一秒又被捧了脸


 


 


“还没醒啊”那人无奈的笑着,晃晃他的脑袋


他才终于从疲倦包裹的壳里慢慢苏醒过来,走廊的玄关灯发出昏暗的光,那人嘴角的笑意却看得很清楚


 


 


“哥哥…”


啊哥哥都要走了呢,裴珍映有些着急,攥住面前人的手腕不肯放


 


 


“不要着急,明天好好的结束拍摄,很快就能见面啦”


攥住手腕的手被轻轻地掰下来放进柔软的掌心里,小指头被温柔地揉搓着


 


 


“旼炫啊,快点儿跟上,别腻腻歪歪的啦!”


经纪人已经上了车,回来捉落队小鸭子的尹智圣也因此敢放肆地大声打趣他们


 


 


黄旼炫探出头笑着应了一声,又转回来多情地看着他


“那我走啦”


 


 


“嗯,我拍摄完就过去”


 


 


“好,我跟他们说我们俩合住一间”


黄旼炫刮刮他的鼻子,拖着行李箱朝等待的保姆车走去,走了几步又回了头,挥挥手示意他赶紧进屋


 


 


那是他们的最后一次见面


 


 


或者说,那是裴珍映以为的,他们的最后一次见面


 


 


【三】


裴珍映不是没有遇见过认识的人


 


 


在他成为死神、第一次单独执行任务的飞行里,他就在邻座偶遇了曾经组合的成员,或者说,只是和曾经组合的成员拥有相同面貌的人,和对方对视以后便脱口而出一句“丹尼尔哥”,却看见对方的神色从礼貌变得疑惑,裴珍映那一瞬的巨大惊喜也在这种神情里被冲荡得干干净净,他在心里无声的笑了,是那种丝毫不掺杂喜悦、只有满腔无奈的那种笑----是啊,算算离他离开怎么也得有一个轮回了,还不兴别人投个胎换个身份再活一世吗


 


 


那他们也做选择了吗


 


 


忘情水孟婆汤的故事裴珍映听过不少,大热的《鬼怪》里阴间使者能够忘却尘世记忆的离别茶他也知道,但怎么到头来只有他一个人带着前世的记忆以不可说的身份混沌的活着呢


 


 


是我自己选的,后来又碰到曾经相交甚好的哥哥弟弟,小心试探地说着你好却也不过收获一句生疏的你好的时候,裴珍映想,是我自己选的,自己站在冒着浓烟和火光的机翼前,面对“抹掉所有记忆转世和带着今生的记忆做我现在做的事”这般的选择,是他自己虽然不知所措却坚定地选择后者的


 


 


当时是为了什么呢,几百年间他问了自己几百遍,今天好像又忍不住想问了,是为了什么呢,是为了记住眼前人吗


 


 


【四】


飞机已经结束上升阶段进入了相对平缓的平行飞行,遮光板被关上了一半,裴珍映缩在毛毯里让自己宕机的大脑进行重启,因为还要分两根神经去注意身旁人的动作,所以这次重启显得尤为缓慢和漫长,等偷瞄到黄旼炫差不多已经看了五页纸的文件了,裴珍映才渐渐清醒过来


 


 


黄旼炫怎么会在这里?


 


 


裴珍映虽然不敢说自己工作多么认真努力,但在执行任务前核对死亡者名单这种只能称得上工作分内的事他倒是一丝不苟地完成了,事关阳寿(和工作奖金),他不敢马虎大意,所以即便这次任务是带回空难中所有的遇难者,送来的遇难者资料堆得比天高,他还是认认真真一页页地翻完了


 


 


没有黄旼炫,绝对不可能有黄旼炫,就算这一世他换了姓名换了身份,可是裴珍映不会记不住他的样子,就像今天看见他的第一眼他便认出来了,黄旼炫是他曾经清晨睁开眼睛看到的第一个人,是他深夜结束行程钻进被窝前看过的最后一个人,他不会忘了黄旼炫的样子的,黄旼炫在冬日早晨抱住整个被子朝他颈边呼气的触感都好像历历在目,如果资料里有黄旼炫,他怎么会认不出呢


 


 


裴珍映侧着身躲在毛毯里一副好像风雨不动安如山的样子,实际上心里都快要抓狂了,他想直接开口问黄旼炫为什么在这里,想大声质问黄旼炫知不知道这架飞机即将坠毁,生还的人连一个都没有,但是黄旼炫怎么会知道呢,就像黄旼炫不知道他是谁一样,黄旼炫怎么会知道飞机即将出事呢,他如果真的开口问了,大概会收获惊恐脸附加瞳孔地震吧,然后过了几百年他们的重逢,黄旼炫对他说的第一句话就是“先生,您神经正常吗”,他不要他不要啊


 


 


“先生,您没事吗?”


 


 


“啊?!”


裴珍映刷的一下从座椅上弹起来,对上黄旼炫疑惑的神情和尴尬停在空中的手指


 


 


“啊…我看您抖得厉害,还以为您…不好意思冒犯了…”


 


 


裴珍映整颗心都快要化了,是他的哥哥啊,真的是他的哥哥啊,在他还是爱豆裴珍映的时候,在他和黄旼炫还没有交心之前,黄旼炫就是这么温柔,哪怕对待陌生人都像春天和煦的风,恋爱以后面对他的撒娇,黄旼炫又在这份温柔上增添了只属于他的宠溺和打趣


 


 


曾经因为黄旼炫行程结束回来没有带他想吃的炒饭和年糕,他穿着毛绒绒的睡衣就地打了一圈滚撒泼,黄旼炫也不拉他,咯咯咯笑了快一分钟,然后顺手就把拍的裴陀螺发聊天群里了,等自体旋转转得头昏眼花的裴珍映气鼓鼓地爬起来,已经收获了聊天页面长达三页纸的哈哈哈了


 


 


裴珍映不懂,这些记忆在他大脑里甚至都还是灵动鲜活的,怎么如今便沧海桑田了呢


 


 


【五】


“啊我没事,可能机舱里空调温度太低了吧”裴珍映随口扯了个谎,撇过头根本不敢和黄旼炫对视


 


 


然而垂着眼倒拿报纸哆嗦了快两分钟,裴珍映才意识到那道目光压根没有收回去,只好又硬着头皮对上:“您有什么事吗”


 


 


“您现在是做什么工作的?”


 


 


裴珍映瞅瞅面前人无懈可击的笑容,再品品这诚恳的语气,脑内雷达开始像野马一样疾驰,心想大事不好,黄旼炫这一世不会干传销去了吧,这都干到头等舱了看来手段可以啊,但是问我是做什么工作的我要怎么回答,我总不能说我是来收拾收拾送你上路的吧


 


 


“嗯?”


 


 


要了命啊,裴珍映想,就这么一个云淡风轻的“嗯”他都觉得苏啊,苏的他恨不得立刻假装恐怖分子逼飞机迫降救他黄旼炫啊


 


 


“我,呵呵,就,给老板打打下手的”


 


 


是啊没错啊哪怕穿西装坐头等舱手下十来个实习生他本质还是个打工的啊,裴珍映本来还打算干完这次就跟所长商量抹了记忆重新投胎去呢,要是真做出什么改变命格的事怕是被罚再打几千年的工也不够啊


 


 


“好”


黄旼炫若有所思的笑了一下,终于不再看他了


 


 


好?好什么好,这有什么好的,他哥这一世怎么神神叨叨的啊


 


 


裴珍映想问问黄旼炫到底想干什么,虽然算算时间黄旼炫就算干什么估计都没啥希望了,不过凭着这张脸,就算人家根本不知道自己姓甚名谁有啥遗愿他还是可以帮忙努力一下啊,清了清嗓子刚想开口,滑动门被“咚咚”敲了两下,是来送餐食的空姐


 


 


裴珍映先把一份接过来放到黄旼炫的桌子上,转头把自己这份打开,然后对着若干条青龙过江无语凝噎,怎么回事,怎么每次挑飞机餐都会出错,从以前放弃软糯糯的米汉堡选择干巴巴的全麦面包,到今天选了香菜全席,怎么了,造假身份上飞机的人不配吃饭吗


 


 


“吃我这份吧,我还没动呢”


这边心里还在流泪,转头却迎接了一份香喷喷热腾腾荤素合理搭配最主要没有半根香菜的饭,裴珍映哭的更大声了,这次是开心的泪水!


 


 


“那谢谢…”“你不是不吃香菜吗”


 


 


裴珍映拿着换的饭还没来得及转回来,就连人带饭滞住了,下一秒猛烈颤抖到快要把盘子打翻的手腕被人握住了


 


 


“裴裴”


裴珍映看他抬起另一只手看了看表


“还有一会儿就要出事了吧,最后一点时间不要躲着我啦”


 


 


“找你好难啊,等你实在太久了”


 


 


【六】


朴志训紧张的盯着裴珍映的右手,踌躇了半天还是开了口


“裴珍映,我知道你和旼炫哥吵架了心情不好,但是你捧着kindle一把鼻涕一把泪也不是个办法啊”


话说到一半又眼疾手快地递上去一张面巾纸


“丑话说在前头,你敢把鼻涕抹到我被子上,我定废了你的翅膀毁了你的天堂”


 


 


“都啥儿玩意儿,哥你别学他们非主流啊”


裴珍映擤擤鼻子,浑然不知自己刚来中国北方巡演了两天就开始学人家的东北腔


 


 


“我看了一粉丝写的小说,老好哭了,我好惨啊”裴珍映皱皱眉头,“哥,要是我那个什么了,你还会记得我吗”


 


 


朴志训听得头疼,心想这都什么乱七八糟的,正好救命门铃响了,赶紧跳下床去开门


 


 


“我也不知道你说你哪个什么,所以我也不敢说我记得你,不过不管你哪个什么,我打包票这位肯定都记得你”


 


 


朴志训把人往房里一领,穿了鞋拿着行李箱就溜


“旼炫哥我走了啊,换房是吧你一会过来取行李哈”


 


 


“不是志训…”


 


 


裴珍映上一架生的气其实早忘了,小情侣之间哪有隔夜仇呢,加上刚看了一篇不青春还伤痛的玄幻小说,黄旼炫一进门他就想往人怀里扑,碍着朴志训还在好歹是忍住了,这会儿他眼力速度双百分的志训哥主动溜了,甚至不用他开口自己提出换房睡,他黄旼炫还开口说不,什么人啊?他黄旼炫想做当代柳下惠啊?


 


 


“和志训聊什么呢”黄旼炫脱了外套坐到床边,“怎么还哭了,他打你啦?”


 


 


黄旼炫当然是开玩笑,但是气鼓鼓的小朋友完全没有捧个场赏脸笑的意思,“人家才不会打我,只有你打我”,黄旼炫哭笑不得,家暴的罪名可不能随便背啊


 


 


“别生气啦裴裴,地三鲜吃不吃,猪肉饺子吃不吃,你晚上都没有吃什么啊”


 


 


“不吃不吃不吃!”裴珍映从被窝里钻出来,站在床上居高临下的看着黄旼炫,“我问问你,你为什么不想跟我睡觉”


 


 


黄旼炫这会儿是真笑了


 


 


什么都不想,就想跟你睡觉


 


 


指针已经慢慢指向了四打头,拉了厚实窗帘的房间里一团墨色,暖气开的很足,裴珍映把脑袋悄悄地扎进被窝,轻轻地搂住了身旁人,但很快就被反搂住了,两只手被握进了更温暖的掌心


 


 


“裴裴”


 


 


“嗯?”


 


 


“我会一直在”


 


 


“嗯”


 


 


“不管什么时候都不会忘记你”


 


 


“嗯”


 


 


“不管什么时候,都爱你”




END


第一次写这种设定 å¤šæœ‰ä¸è¶³


如果可以看到这里 éž èº¬æ„Ÿè°¢

太可爱啦

安妮毛七:

我很喜欢的一个推特旼狼玩家画的漫画,汉化了一下,给同样喜欢旼狼的大家一起看~ 

海的儿子

可爱一篇

小步舞曲:

 


李可乐生贺,少量赖狼。无脑故事,最近比较忙,写着玩。


愿两位小王子都能健康成长^ ^


 


 


 


 


 


******** 


 


 


 


 


 


01


 


晚风拂动海面,夕阳悄悄西沉。蔚蓝海域下暗潮涌动,推着过往的船只缓慢前行。直至暮色四合,这片海域彻底趋于宁静。负责查探外部情况的水母沉入海底,把人类已经离开的消息,传达给了这片海域的国王。


 


穿过珊瑚搭建的宫殿,国王坐在最明亮的地方,向海底所有的生物宣布,今夜的盛宴正式开场。国王的第六个孩子于清晨出世,眼下正齐聚一堂,庆贺这颗掌上明珠的诞生。


 


她的五个姐姐,有的早已嫁做人妇,有的隐于世间,有的藏于深海。此刻不约而同赶回宫殿,为最小的妹妹献上最珍贵的祝福。缎带严丝合缝包裹着的礼盒,整齐摆放的明珠,璀璨夺目。


 


心思细密的邕巫师最先站了出来,他向这座宫殿的主人行了个礼,尔后轻轻抬了抬手:“我祝小公主身体健康,快乐无忧。”


 


同他一起修习的金巫师也为公主准备了属于她的礼物,只见他伸出手指,在小人鱼的脸上一点。


 


“小公主会拥有牛奶一样白的皮肤,星辰一般的眼睛,亭匀合衬的身姿。”金巫师眨了眨眼睛,挑衅他的同伴,“健康固然重要,公主理应是这片海域里最美丽可爱的人鱼。”


 


国王紧绷的面容,总算是松动了几分。两位巫师正欲退下,不想那位让国王面色难看的罪魁祸首,还是闯了进来。宫殿门口守卫的鱼虾跌跌撞撞的倒在地上,仍不忘自己的职责,吐着气泡禀报:“陛下,姜巫师他执意要来,我们没能拦住他。”


 


两位巫师心里一紧,纷纷朝他们的挚友投去制止的目光,对方却不为所动。


 


姜巫师是这片海域里最聪明的巫师。


 


在别人还在研习入门术法时,他已经能够灵活驱使那些未开灵识的生物了。直到小公主出生的十天前,姜巫师老神在在的说,他很快就要离开这里了,他要去寻找更重要的事物。国王一向看重他的才华,自然不肯放他离开。姜巫师的躯体被困在了海底,可所有人都知道,他一定会走的。


 


行事诡秘的姜巫师,此刻自然是庆生宴上的唯一变数。国王担心他会赶来破坏,加了一倍的守卫,仍是没能防的住。


 


戴着耳钉的巫师向他的朋友释放了一个安定的笑容,随后走向大殿的正前方。国王竖起了眉毛,手劲将身下雕花的座椅震得一响。巫师却将食指置于唇上,示意对方小声些。睡得香甜的小公主似乎察觉到了外界的剑拔弩张,睁开了迷茫的眼睛。


 


巫师对上她的眼睛,忽地笑了出来。


 


“这么紧张做什么。小公主出生的好日子,都没有人邀请我吗。不过没关系,看在她这么可爱的份上,我仍然祝福她,能够找到一位属于她的王子。”


 


国王松了口气,他预想的事情,一件都没有发生。


 


送上祝福的巫师摆了摆手,像是从来没有出现过一般,离开了大殿。


 


 


 


 


02


 


小公主身上带着整片海域的祝福,平安无恙的成长着。她有着漆黑柔软的头发丝,红扑扑的脸颊,笑起来还会咧出可爱的小酒窝。


 


姜巫师给她取了名字。琳琳,大约是寓意珍宝吧。他并没有在纸上写下来,国王是个性子急的,一听就拍板定论,就叫琳琳吧。


 


十岁那年,宫殿里只剩下了还未出嫁的五姐陪着她。


 


五姐平日里胆量最小,却也快到了可以浮出海面的年纪。她的皮肤比小公主琳琳还要白上几分,更透出了一丝柔弱。


 


琳琳懵懵懂懂的问她:“姐姐,海面上是不是有很坏的人类?”


 


小公主从小就听过了那个发生在邻海的故事。十五岁的小美人鱼爱上了王子,心甘情愿化作泡沫,从此再也见不着海里的父母和朋友了。她不太了解其中复杂的感情,只觉得王子实在是世界上最坏的人了。


 


如今得知了姐姐要去人类的世界,理所当然地担心起来了。


 


五公主摸摸她的脑袋,声音细细的:“人类也不全都是坏的,姐姐会保护好自己的。”


 


她闷闷不乐的答应了一声,嘴里念念有词:“姐姐不能和王子在一起!”


 


随后又拽住姐姐的衣裙,眼巴巴的望着:“那你回来的时候,一定记得要告诉我,在海面上看到了什么。”


 


小孩子的好奇心终究还是压倒了一切的。


 


琳琳公主掰着手指等了一天又一天,两只手都快算完了,总算等来了面上含羞带怯的姐姐。最是胆小的姐姐却没有像以前一样来找她,而是把时间都用来和父王抗争了。她偷偷问身边的仆从,姐姐这是怎么啦。


 


有胆大的仆人见她年纪小,说话也就没了顾忌。


 


“五公主爱上海对面的一个平民啦!”


 


琳琳撇撇嘴,这有什么,不是王子就行,王子是这个世界上最坏的人。


 


温柔胆怯的五公主难得执拗,无奈的国王陛下在和女儿的拉锯战中输的惨烈。她高高兴兴地出嫁了,送嫁的人群熙熙攘攘,琳琳缩着肩膀不敢过去,只远远地看了姐姐一眼。


 


然而她还是不知道外面的世界里到底有些什么。


 


 


 


 


 


 


03


 


小公主十四岁了。平日里如新月清晕,偶尔展露笑颜时,又似花树堆雪,是深海里默认的小美人。


 


可当她年岁渐长,身边的仆从都有了一个心照不宣的疑问。


 


一位公主怎么会长出喉结呢?


 


她的五官还是那么温柔,气质却不知在何时凌厉了起来。仆从们私下里唧唧喳喳,推举了见识最广的一个侍女去找姜巫师。


 


至于面见国王,那是万万不敢去的。


 


侍女红扑扑的脸上嵌着几粒雀斑,在姜巫师门前踌躇了许久,终于下定了决心,不想一头撞上了他宽厚的肩。本就发红的面颊更是鲜艳欲滴,绞着手指问:“姜巫师,你能不能...能不能去看看小公主?”


 


姜巫师长眉一挑,跟着侍女往宫殿的方向去。


 


琳琳也有一段时间没有见过姜巫师了。


 


他们之间一直保持着奇妙的友情,尽管琳琳连这个聪明的男人的岁数都不知道。她矜持地坐在殿前的雕花座椅上,好奇地问着他四处游历都见到了些什么。


 


他不疾不徐地回答着公主殿下的疑问,直到她终于想不到更多的问题。姜巫师伸手掀开她软软的刘海儿,碎发遮住了她英挺的眉毛,只露出一双圆溜溜的大眼睛,叫人难以分辨。琳琳屏住呼吸,听见他低缓的声音。


 


“霖霖……你知道吗,其实你的名字是霖霖。不是玉石叮咚发出的响声,是久下不停的雨。”


 


琳琳,哦不,现在应该叫霖霖了。


 


霖霖疑惑的开口:“是这样吗?”尽管如此,她还是努力让自己接受了这个新名字。


 


明珠在黑夜里闪闪发光,姜巫师的声音宛似魔咒般侵入霖霖十四岁的脑袋。


 


“记得把头发剪一剪。阴柔的男孩子才适合长发,而你是最英俊的男孩子,短发会更好看。”


 


“明天带你去找邕巫师那家伙吧,我的小王子。”


 


他将目光转向那位邀他前来的侍女,神色自若,放缓了语速:“一位公主怎么会长出喉结呢?”


 


侍女硬着头皮迎上巫师的目光。她甚至还没能完全消化掉姜巫师的话,然而对方并没有给她留下一点点思考的时间,又重新添上了新的重击。


 


“因为他并不是什么公主,而是货真价实的王子。”


 


姜巫师吹着小调回到了他的房间。国王刚愎自用,自然是要付出一定的代价的。至于这代价,只是做了持续很久但无伤大雅的障眼法,并不为过吧?


 


快步离开的他,错过了侍女跌跌撞撞走出门去找国王的模样。理所当然的,国王气得连摔三盏茶杯,也只是苦了身边的随从。


 


 


 


 


 


04


 


夭寿啦!


 


国王养了十四年的小女儿竟然是小儿子!


 


霖霖麻木的任邕巫师给他修剪了头发,即使是恢复成了男儿身,容貌也不比之前逊色。少了几分温婉,多出的是属于少年的清俊。


 


比起对于性别的认知,更让他感到不安的事情实际上是很难以言喻的。


 


他竟然是一位王子!


 


王子,是这个世界上最坏的生物。可他现在也是一位王子了,霖霖不安的攥紧了拳头。姜巫师打了个响指,赞许道:“不错嘛。”


 


赞许也不能让他的心情变好一点。


 


他失落的望向姜巫师:“我真的是男孩子吗?”他甚至不愿意用王子这个词。


 


对方斩钉截铁地回答他:“是的。”


 


好在还有一件事情是值得期待的。霖霖快要满十五岁啦,再过几个月,他就能够浮出海面,去看一看外面的世界。他暂且把这件不快的事情压下心底,满心等待着长大。


 


千盼万盼,十五岁生日总算到来了。


 


霖霖憋红着脸,眼眶里藏着水珠,挣扎着不肯掉下来:“姜哥哥,我需要把我的声音给你,才能换到一双腿吗?”


 


姜巫师笑弯了腰。他的声音里有霖霖听不懂的意思,面色还是温柔的:“当然不用啦。霖霖是最可爱的男孩子,不需要向任何人付出代价。”


 


他果真拥有了一双腿。起初见着自己的模样还不太习惯,对着明镜傻兮兮的左照右照,小心翼翼地迈出一步又一步。直到能灵活控制那双长腿,霖霖抿着嘴,在明镜前露出了一个甜劲儿十足的小梨涡。


 


三位巫师给他的小小行囊里塞满了器物,脸上写着的是满满的担忧。


 


霖霖摆摆手,男孩子嘛,应该勇敢一点。他绷直了两条腿,朝着三位巫师微笑,再见啦,哥哥们!


 


勇敢的霖霖要去创造奇迹啦!


 


 


 


 


 


05


 


陆地上看海,平静而温和,没有人会知道海底还藏着那样一座宫殿。深海外的天空很美,万里无云。叶子郁郁葱葱的挤在树杈上,风神偶然经过,吹拂一地落叶。


 


可是霖霖很沮丧。


 


他有了新的梦想。他不想去环游世界,也不愿意创造奇迹了。


 


晴朗凉爽的九月,背负着梦想的霖霖,现在只想跟着眼前的这个男孩走。在宫殿里,他是没什么朋友的,身边除了侍从就是比他大了很多的巫师。甫一离家,就遇上了一个同龄人。更何况这个同龄人看起来好像知道很多的样子,说的每一件小事,霖霖都听得津津有味。


 


他紧张兮兮地自我介绍:“我我我,我叫霖霖。”


 


男孩大方的回复他:“我叫裴珍映,你喊我裴裴就可以。”


 


裴裴给他说了很多路上的见闻,古堡里等待解救的公主,魔法森林里奇异的动物,拼尽全力守护旧土的山神。霖霖一边听他说话,圆溜溜的眼睛黏在了他身上。小小的脸,神采飞扬的眸子,细瘦的脖颈,为什么这个人类从头到脚都这么招他喜欢呢?


 


月明星稀,两个少年并肩躺在天空下,身上笼罩着一层淡淡的月光。


 


夜风喧嚣,轻抚过两人的脸。霖霖偷偷偏过头看他,他们之间的距离很近,少年的头发丝在风的助力下,落在了他的脸上。


 


霖霖脸红了。


 


他不好意思的转过去,闷闷地问:“你要去哪里啊?”


 


“可能再转一转,就会回家吧。”


 


“那你家在哪啊?”他问的天真,全然不顾其他。


 


少年不介意,面对着他将食指竖在了唇间:“其实我是个王子啦。偷偷溜出来,总是要回去的。”


 


他是王子!


 


可王子不都是坏人吗?


 


霖霖心下纠结的要死,默默绞了半天手指,差点急出眼泪来。


 


裴珍映察觉到他的不对劲,安抚的拍了拍他的肩:“怎么了?”


 


这下忍不住了。眼泪落在地上,和夜里的雾气混在一起,平白添了一身湿气。他抽抽鼻子:“我好喜欢你啊,可是你是个王子,我不喜欢王子。”


 


颠三倒四的话,也亏得裴珍映理解力超群,才领会了他的意思。


 


不过他不明白的是,世界上还有人有王子恐惧症吗?


 


“那是喜欢我多一点,还是讨厌王子多一点呢?”


 


霖霖止住眼泪,认真的想了想,他忽然间福至心灵,将此刻与儿时故事联系在了一起,总归是明白了小人鱼和王子的爱情。他郑重地拉住裴珍映的手腕,语气坚定。


 


“还是喜欢你。”




比喜欢温柔的姐姐还要多,比喜欢海底的趣物还要多。




身旁的少年笑得开怀,吹散一地露水。




情窦初开的小王子却仍是期期艾艾,犹豫了很久又冒出一句叫人哭笑不得的话来。




“可是我能不能不变成泡沫啊?”


 


 


 


 


 


 


06


 


姜巫师多多少少还是有几分愧疚的。


 


当霖霖小王子牵着另一个男孩的手回到宫殿时,十五年前他胡乱说出的话忽地飘了出来。“不过没关系,看在她这么可爱的份上,我仍然祝福她,能够找到一位属于她的王子。”


 


只是现在没人会想起这句例行的祝福。


 


他用自身能够驱使的能力,为小王子许下了另一个祝福。


 


愿你岁岁平安,福泽有余,与心爱之人修得圆满。


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


07


 


转眼间又是一年。


 


裴珍映勾着小王子的手指,懒洋洋道:“你自己不也是个王子,这下好了,我一个王子竟然没有找到公主,反而找了你这么个傻子。”


 


霖霖羞红了脸,不服气:“不行,你都跟我回家啦,不许反悔的!”


 


“好好好,不反悔。”裴珍映将他气鼓鼓的脸扳过来,在小梨涡处轻轻碰了一下,弯起眉眼,“生日快乐,我的小王子。”


 


王子不必打败守卫高塔的恶龙,也不用寻找温柔可人的公主。


 


因为最后的最后,王子和王子在一起啦。


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


Fin.


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 



我看见夏日的男孩


comacomacomaaaa:

Johnny & Ten




我看见夏日的男孩*




1





“我看见夏日的男孩在毁灭,


什一税制金色家园荒凉,


沃土冻结,没有一丝的丰盈;


他们携着妙龄少女,


热情融化冬日里冰封的爱情,


他们汹涌的波涛淹没满舱的苹果。




这些光的男孩,累积几多的荒唐,


搅酸沸滚的蜂蜜;


他们在蜂巢里拨弄严寒的霜凌;


阳光下几丝寒冷的疑虑和幽暗


养育他们的神经;


一轮信号月消失在虚幻里。




我看见夏日的孩子在母胎中


撕裂强壮子宫的风雨,


神奇的拇指划分出白昼和黑夜;


在日月分割的浓荫深处,


他们涂抹自己的堤坝,


仿佛日光涂抹他们脱落的颅壳。




我看见男孩一个个成了无名之辈,


随种子的变换渐渐成熟,


热情的跳跃或许让空气残缺;


三伏天涌动的阳光和爱情


从心里向喉口骤然迸发。


哦,看那冰雪中夏日的脉动。”





    æˆ‘çš„Ten坐在窗边读书,午后的阳光洒在他那在夏日晒黑了的肌肤上,温柔地渗入他的血液里。他的睫毛微微颤动,嘴唇轻轻撅起,像是不懂书里的内容,他那懊恼的模样可爱极了。


    ä»–就像是一只乖巧的猫,在听见我的脚步声后机敏地抬起头。他将书扔在了窗台上,光着脚向我跑来。


    æˆ‘娇小的男孩,用他的手臂攀上我的肩膀,轻盈地跳跃,脚盘在我的腰上。他咯咯笑着,像是见了什么新奇的事物一样。


    æˆ‘用手扶在他的臀部上以防他掉下去,这是绝佳的时刻,我从来不会放过任何一次能和他亲昵的机会。我问他,你今晚要不要住在这里。


    Ten笑着说当然,随后自己跳在了地面上。我有段时间没有打扫过房间了,他的脚底板沾了些灰尘。


    äºŽæ˜¯æˆ‘蹲下身去,虔诚地捧起他的右脚,用我口袋里的手帕为他擦拭。


    æˆ‘的男孩觉得痒了,在我头顶发出笑声,用手轻轻拍了下我的头,说Johnny快停手,太痒了。


    å¦‚果可以,我甚至愿意用我的舌头舔干净他身上的污渍。


    ä½†æˆ‘不会这么做。


    æˆ‘只能抬起头对他说,下次记得穿好袜子,并让他赶紧去洗个澡。




    æˆ‘的男孩躺在我的怀中,听我念着那些他不大明白的诗词,他困惑却从来不发问。我替他掖好背角,任由他将自己光洁冰凉的小腿覆在我的腿上,我对他说,这诗是我最喜欢的。


    ä½ çš„声音很好听。他没有对内容做出评论,就像怕我追问似的,将额头抵在我的肩膀上,柔声说他困了。


    æˆ‘拿他没辙,只好为他关上台灯。他放松地叹息着,在被窝里让我和他的十指紧扣。


    æˆ‘不想回家了。我的男孩说,我想和你永远在一起。


    å¤šä¹ˆç¾Žä¸½çš„话啊,我忍不住亲吻他的额头。




    çˆ¶æ¯å®‰æŽ’我在大学里做教授,这份工作我算不上喜欢,因为我总得接受来自我的学生们愚蠢的提问和撇脚的见解,并且必须得耐心地告诉他们,有自己的想法是正确的。


    æˆ‘的男孩不一样。他是我的宠物,我的玩偶,他的纯真让他像水晶般透明。


    å½“我的学生道英来到我的办公室时,我正坐在桌前想着我的男孩。他的打扰让我心烦,而我只能对他回以笑容。


    æˆ‘让道英坐在沙发上,听着他讲他这补交的作业。一部伟大的作品他只花了几天的时间阅读,仅花了几小时准备,这让我对他的回答没有了期待。他虽然说了一些可取的话,却仍有一大堆没用的见解,我听完,在记分册上打下分数,对他微笑。


    ä»–也羞涩地回给我笑容。


    æˆ‘想他对我有些着迷了。并不是我太自恋,而是我深知自己能够吸引什么样的人。


    æˆ‘会对他冷漠,尽量疏远。看着他失落的神情,我没有一丝愧疚。


    


    ä»»ä½•äººéƒ½æ¯”不上我的Ten。




    æˆ‘çš„Ten住在我的楼上,当刚来到这个城市时,我执意不接受家里的帮助,仅靠自己的存款,我只得住在这间公寓里。嘎吱响的木楼梯让人心烦,薄墙壁无法隔音,起初我想尽快搬离这破地方。


    å¯æ˜¯æˆ‘遇见了Ten。可能对他来说,那天的记忆不算愉快。


    é‚£æ—¶å€™æˆ‘还在一家书店打工,微薄的薪水甚至不能满足我的日常花销,所幸在书店里我能在闲暇时省下一笔买书的钱。书店关门的时间较晚,楼道的灯早就坏掉了,当我走上那破旧的楼梯时,伴着嘎吱的声响,我听见了男孩的啜泣声。


    æˆ‘çš„Ten就这么坐在那丑陋又肮脏的木梯上,他家的门半掩着,那微弱的冷光衬得暗处中的他的眼睛像黑砖石发着亮。我站在那里,愣神许久,直到我听见门后有人喊着:Ten,回来!


    æˆ‘çš„Ten向我伸出了手,仿佛我是他的救世主般,当我站上他那一层阶梯时,他扯住了我的裤脚。


    æˆ‘çš„Ten对我说:


    æ•‘我吧,带我回家。


    å¦‚果禁果化作人形,大概就会是他的模样。






    å¤©æ°”燥热,我的Ten穿着我的白色上衣踏进了放着冷水的浴缸里。他说他想去游泳池,但害怕自己身上的伤疤会吓到别人。


    æˆ‘搬了个凳子坐在浴缸边,用手指触碰水面,装作在试探水的温度的样子,一点点、一点点地那美好的肉体靠近。


    æˆ‘çš„Ten没有丝毫的防备,濡湿了的薄衫让他的身体毫不设防地展现在我的眼前。我稍微弯下身,卑劣地想要将他的一切记录在脑海里。


    ä½ æ¬ä¸Šæ¥å’Œæˆ‘一起住吧。我又一次向Ten提议道。


    æˆ‘的男孩沉默了,他垂下眼看着水里的自己的手,微微弯曲他右手的拇指和食指,像是在思考。


    æˆ‘等待着他的同意,又或者是拒绝。


    å¯æ˜¯æˆ‘还是想去泳池,这浴缸里根本没有办法游泳。


    å¤šå¯çˆ±å•Šï¼Œæˆ‘这狡猾的,擅长转移话题的男孩。




    é“英总来我的办公室,用撇脚的借口希望我能和他多聊两句。心情好时我会让他坐在沙发上,和他讲一讲我最近看的诗集,他总尝试让我念一首,但我都拒绝了。诗是读给爱人听的,而道英只不过是我的一位普通学生。


    æˆ‘偶尔会用道英的话题来试探我的男孩,我希望能从他的眼中读出妒意,这样我就能够抓住嫉妒的藤蔓往上爬,去触碰我心中敢想不敢做的禁忌之事。然而我的男孩听见陌生人的名字时毫无反应。


    æˆ‘对我的男孩说,我只给我爱的人读诗。


    è€Œæˆ‘çš„Ten只是笑,他的眼角弯成我最爱的弧度,他的手抓着我的手臂,用甜蜜的嗓音跟我说,再给我念那首诗吧。






2



“但是,季节必须接受挑战或坠入


一处钟声齐鸣的地方;


在那儿,我们摇响星星,死亡般准时;


在夜晚,扯动黑舌的丧钟,


女人吹动风,却吹不回午夜的月光。




我们是黑色的反叛者,让我们


从夏日的女人召唤死亡,


从痉挛的情人处,召唤强悍的生命,


在漂浮大海的白净尸体上,


召唤戴维神灯上眼睛明亮的蠕虫,


从种植的子宫里召唤稻草人。




我们这群夏日的男孩,在呼呼生风的旋转中,


海藻般的铁绿植物,


举起喧嚣的大海,放飞一群群海鸟,


捡拾世上球状的波浪和泡沫,


让潮汐窒息沙漠,


为扎一只花环,梳理乡间的花园。




在春天,我们用冬青枝缠绕前额,


嘿,还有鲜血和浆果,


快乐的乡绅被钉上树干;


湿漉漉的肌肉在此枯干而亡,


热吻在无情的采石场裂成碎片。


哦,看孩子们信誓旦旦的爱情柱。”





   å½“女孩穿着黑色吊带裙来到男孩床边时,男孩下意识地吞了口唾沫,他有些胆怯,从膝盖处,焦急地想把手往大腿根处探过去。而后女孩羞涩地拍开男孩的腿,娇嗔地说:只准看,不许动手。


    ç”·å­©æ‡Šæ¼åœ°çš±çœ‰ï¼Œç½®æ°”地退回床边,双手抱膝对女孩抱怨道:你总是这样。


    Ten,女孩撒娇,你知道我家教很严的呀。


    ä½ å«Œå¼ƒæˆ‘。男孩不愿意看女孩。


    ä¸æ˜¯çš„。女孩倾身,亲了亲男孩的脸颊,我最喜欢你了。


    é‚£ä½ ä¸ºä»€ä¹ˆä¸æ„¿æ„è·Ÿæˆ‘走?


    å¥³å­©æ²‰é»˜ã€‚


    æˆ‘存够了钱了,我可以带你去任何你想去的地方。男孩焦急地抓住女孩的肩膀。


    å¥³å­©åƒç—›åœ°å‘»åŸäº†ä¸€å£°ï¼Œå¾…男孩松开手,她将自己的头靠在男孩的肩膀上。


    è¿™ç˜¦å¼±çš„男孩值得她依靠吗?她足够爱他吗?女孩思考着,却肆意让自己去汲取男孩身上的温度。


    æˆ‘喜欢你的,Ten,再等等我嘛。女孩说。




    ç”·å­©æ˜¯å¯æ€•çš„,他们看似懵懂无知,却能够很快适应环境,洞察一切。Ten就是这样的男孩,他深知自己的魅力,便用此来获得他想要的东西。


    èº«ä¸Šçš„伤口不仅来自他的母亲,还有一些有特殊癖好的顾客。男孩认为皮肉被怎样对待都无所谓,他的思想永远属于女孩,那个在商店门口对还是陌生人的他傻傻地笑着女孩。


    ä»–将钱存进银行,把卡藏在一双捡来的旧鞋鞋垫下,又把那旧鞋放进了Johnny家的鞋柜。他编了个关于鞋的悲伤故事,希望Johnny不要碰这双鞋。


    Johnny相信他所说的一切。起初,他只不过是想把Johnny发展成自己的长期顾客,毕竟他们住楼上楼下,对他来说非常方便。可Johnny从来没有碰过他。他当然看得出Johnny对自己有心思,却不明白这个男人为什么刻意的压抑住自己的欲望。


    ç”·å­©å¸¦ç€å¥½å¥‡å¿ƒï¼Œä¸€æ¬¡åˆä¸€æ¬¡åœ°å°è¯•æ’©æ‹¨ç”·äººï¼Œåˆä¸€æ¬¡æ¬¡åœ°å¤±è´¥äº†ã€‚


    äºŽæ˜¯ç”·å­©å°±è¿™ä¹ˆäº«å—着Johnny对他的宠爱。他把楼上的住宅当做避风港,当他累了,烦躁的时候,他会上楼去享受男人的疼爱。


    æœ‰æ—¶å€™ä»–会在心底嘲笑这个男人,当男人像对待易碎的水晶小心翼翼地触碰他时,他想着自己和男人心里所想的完全不同,就觉得男人可笑。他无时无刻,不在使着坏心眼,想要诱惑男人,想要让男人变得跟其他顾客一样。


    å¯ç”·äººåªä¼šè®©ä»–们的十指紧扣。就像他们之间纯洁得根本没有别的杂念似的。


    ç”·å­©æ˜Žç™½è‡ªå·±æƒ³è¦çš„是什么,却不明白男人究竟想从他身上得到什么。


    å¶å°”,只是偶尔,他有想过去主动亲一亲男人那干燥的双唇。




    


    å½“男孩再偷偷去女孩房间时,他被女孩的父亲发现,挨了顿打。


    é‚£äº›è¾±éª‚男孩的不入耳词汇让女孩哭成了泪人,却只能在父权的威慑下哭喊着让男孩快跑。


    ç”·å­©ç”šè‡³è¿žéž‹éƒ½æ¥ä¸åŠç©¿ï¼Œä»–愤怒地在大街上奔跑着,险些被车撞到,可他跑着,没有停下。


    ä»–去了家附近的公园,坐在板凳上哭泣,把不甘化作泪水。四周无人,于是他放肆地嚎叫着,试图把那些悲伤的情绪全发泄出来。


    ç›´åˆ°ä»–的嗓子沙哑,直到他感觉自己在发抖,而他的脚底早被磨破。


    ä»–没有想到女孩会在自家楼下等着他,那一刻他欣喜万分。


    çœ‹ç€å“­è‚¿äº†çœ¼ç›çš„女孩,他冲上前去,捧着那苍白的脸庞,掠夺那柔软双唇的温度。


    æˆ‘来看看你。女孩在吻的间隙中说,我偷跑出来的,我还得回去。


    åˆ«å›žåŽ»äº†ï¼Œæˆ‘求你。


    ä¸ï¼Œçˆ¸çˆ¸ä¼šç”Ÿæ°”的。


    ç”·å­©å¥³å­©è‚†æ„äº²å»ç€ï¼Œç”¨å°½äº†å…¨åŠ›ï¼Œç”·å­©ç”¨è›®åŠ›å°†å¥³å­©çš„裙子往下扯,想去探寻他从未到过的地方。


    Ten。


    ç”·äººçš„声音从身后传来,男孩停下了手。




3



“夏日的男孩,我看见你们在毁灭。


男人在蛆虫遍布的荒野。


而男孩的囊袋鼓鼓,非同凡响。


我是男人,你的父亲也是。


我们是燧石和沥青的子孙。


哦,当他们穿过,看爱情柱在亲吻。”





    Johnny的反应和Ten想象得不一样。


    è™½ç„¶ä»–的双手双脚被绑住了,但Johnny依旧害怕会伤到他,不断地询问绑得会不会太紧了些。


    Ten没有说话,他被Johnny抱进没有防水的浴缸里,Johnny用剪刀剪碎了他的衣服,随后放出热水。


    æ¸æ¸åœ°ï¼Œæ°´æ±½æœ¦èƒ§äº†æµ´å®¤é‡Œä¸¤äººçš„脸。Ten眨了眨眼睛,看着Johnny。


    æ‰“我,上我,随便你选。Ten讥笑道。


    æˆ‘不会反抗的,我已经习惯了。


    Johnny沉默着,他等水湮没Ten的身体。然后打上肥皂泡,温柔地为Ten清洗着。


    æ¸©æ°´å†²æ•£å¸¦ç€æŸ æª¬é¦™æ°”的泡沫,水滴滴答落入水中,他们还是像以前一样,仿佛在楼下撞见的场景只是他们的一场梦。


    è¿™å¯¹Ten来说,这样的温柔以待才是真正的酷刑,他宁愿Johnny和其他人一样。


    ä»–的心被撕碎了,他痛苦地咬紧下唇不愿意让盈满眼眶的水汽化成泪珠。


    Johnny察觉到了Ten在强忍,于是便让Ten背过身去,为他清洗后背。


    ä½ æ¨æˆ‘吧。Ten咬着牙恳求道。


    æˆ‘知道你在鞋底藏了东西,Johnny说,以后不要把密码设成自己的生日。


    ä½ å–走了……


    æˆ‘存了些钱进去。


    ç”·å­©ç»ˆäºŽå¿ä¸ä½ï¼Œå“­å‡ºäº†å£°éŸ³ã€‚


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1. Standard of Deference

There is competing authority on the level of deference owed by U.S. courts to a foreign government's official statement regarding its own laws and regulations. In the seminal case United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942), the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, the extraterritorial reach of a 1918 decree nationalizing Russia's insurance business. The record before the Pink Court included expert testimony and “voluminous” other evidence bearing on the proper interpretation of the 1918 decree and its extraterritorial effect. Id. at 218, 62 S.Ct. 552. This evidence included an official declaration of the Russian Government explaining the intended extraterritorial effect of the decree. See id. at 219–20, 62 S.Ct. 552. The Court “d[id] not stop to review” the whole body of evidence, however, id. at 218, 62 S.Ct. 552, because it determined that the official declaration was “conclusive” as to the extraterritorial effect of the decree, id. at 220, 62 S.Ct. 552.

Since 1942, several courts have cited Pink for the proposition that an official statement or declaration from a foreign government clarifying its laws must be accepted as “conclusive.” See, e.g., D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F.Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977) (“The principle of Pink requires this Court to accept the opinion of the attorney general of Mexico as an official declaration by that government that the effect of the expropriation decree was to extinguish Papantla's royalty and participating rights in the expropriated oil.”); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F.Supp. 1324, 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000) (accepting as conclusive an opinion issued by the Department of Justice of the Republic of the Philippines and presented to the court articulating the scope and effect of a law of the Philippines); but see Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp, 197 F.3d 694, 714 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917, 121 S.Ct. 276, 148 L.Ed.2d 200 (2000) (holding, without citation to Pink, that “[t]he fact that U.S. courts routinely give deference to U.S. agencies empowered to interpret U.S. law and U.S. courts may give deference to foreign governments before the court does not entail that U.S. courts must give deference to all agency determinations made by all foreign agencies not before the court.”).

Other courts, however, have intimated that while the official statements of a foreign government interpreting its laws are entitled to deference, U.S. courts need not accept such statements as conclusive. For example, in Amoco Cadiz, presented with conflicting interpretations of a French law, the Seventh Circuit held that “[a] court of the United States owes substantial deference to the construction France places upon its domestic law․ Giving the conclusions of a sovereign nation less respect than those of [a United States] administrative agency is unacceptable.” In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).

The district court below, at the motion to dismiss stage, relied on three authorities—Rule 44.1, Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2008), and Karaha Bodas, 313 F.3d 70—for the proposition that the Second Circuit, in particular, has “adopted a softer view toward the submissions of foreign governments.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d at 557. We disagree with this conclusion.

Contrary to the district court's reasoning, we find no support for the argument that Rule 44.1, adopted in 1966 long after Pink was decided, modified the level of deference that a U.S. court must extend to a foreign government's interpretation of its own laws. Rule 44.1 provides that, when determining foreign law, a court “may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. According to the advisory committee notes, the rule has two purposes: (1) to make a court's determination of foreign law a matter of law rather than fact, and (2) to relax the evidentiary standard and to create a uniform procedure for interpreting foreign law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee's notes to 1966 adoption. The advisory committee notes suggest that Rule 44.1 was meant to address some of the challenges facing litigants whose claims and defenses depended upon foreign law and to provide courts with a greater array of tools for understanding and interpreting those laws. Id. Rule 44.1 explicitly focuses on what a court may consider when determining foreign law, but it is silent as to how a court should analyze the relevant material or sources. Thus, courts must still evaluate the relevant source material within the context of each case. See, e.g., Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 14–15 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that because “Mexican law is much different” than New York state law and “its sources do not lie in precedent cases” the court must “consider the text of the constitution, civil code and statutory provisions ․ and give them preponderant consideration” when analyzing Mexican law). Finding no authority to the contrary, we conclude that Rule 44.1 does not alter the legal standards by which courts analyze foreign law, and thus, the rule does not abrogate or “soften” the level of deference owed by U.S. courts to statements of foreign governments appearing in U.S. courts.

The district court looked to our decision in Villegas Duran to bolster its conclusion that this court has adopted a softer view toward submissions of foreign governments. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d at 557. In Villegas Duran we declined to credit an affidavit from the Chilean Government that clarified the appellant's child custody rights under Chilean law. 534 F.3d at 148 (“Reasons existed for the district court to refrain from giving the affidavit absolute deference.”). We consider Villegas Duran inapplicable to the present case for two reasons. First, because the Chilean Government did not appear before the court in that case, either as a party or as an amicus, the level of deference the court afforded the Chilean affidavit does not guide our application here. Second, Villegas Duran was overturned by the Supreme Court, Duran v. Beaumont, 560 U.S. 921, 130 S.Ct. 3318, 176 L.Ed.2d 1216 (2010), in light of Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 176 L.Ed.2d 789 (2010). In Abbott, the Court analyzed the same Chilean custody law at issue in Villegas Duran but found the very same affidavit from the Chilean Government that was submitted in Villegas Duran “notable” in its analysis of Chilean law and adopted Chile's interpretation of that law. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10–11, 130 S.Ct. 1983 (“[I]t is notable that a Chilean agency has explained that [the Chilean law] is a ‘right to authorize the minors' exit’ from Chile and that this provision means that neither parent can ‘unilaterally’ â€˜establish the [child's] place of residence.’ ” (internal quotation omitted)). To the extent that the majority's analysis in Villegas Duran suggests that a foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own laws warrants a lesser degree of deference, the Supreme Court's approach in interpreting Chilean law—relying, in part, on the Chilean Government's affidavit—requires us to question, if not reject, Villegas Duran as precedent bearing on that issue.

Finally, the district court also relied on our decision in Karaha Bodas, 313 F.3d 70, to support its conclusion. In that case, a judgment creditor of an oil and gas company owned and controlled by the Republic of Indonesia sought to execute upon funds held in New York trust accounts. Id. at 71. The Republic of Indonesia joined the appeal as a party with an affected interest, and in so doing, sought to clarify the applicable Indonesian law as well as the Indonesian Government's relationship with the gas company. Id. Citing to our sister circuits in Amoco Cadiz and Access Telecom, we credited the Republic of Indonesia's interpretation and explained that “a foreign sovereign's views regarding its own laws merit—although they do not command—some degree of deference.” Id. at 92. We clarified that, â€œwhere a choice between two interpretations of ambiguous foreign law rests finely balanced, the support of a foreign sovereign for one interpretation furnishes legitimate assistance in the resolution of interpretive dilemmas.” Id.

It is noteworthy that, while we suggested in Karaha Bodas that deference to a foreign sovereign's interpretation need not be “conclusive” in every case, we ultimately adopted the Republic of Indonesia's interpretation of its own regulation.8 Indeed, we have yet to identify a case where a foreign sovereign appeared before a U.S. tribunal and the U.S. tribunal adopted a reading of that sovereign's laws contrary to that sovereign's interpretation of them.

Consistent with our holding in Karaha Bodas and the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Pink, we reaffirm the principle that when a foreign government, acting through counsel or otherwise, directly participates in U.S. court proceedings by providing a sworn evidentiary proffer regarding the construction and effect of its laws and regulations, which is reasonable under the circumstances presented, a U.S. court is bound to defer to those statements. If deference by any measure is to mean anything, it must mean that a U.S. court not embark on a challenge to a foreign government's official representation to the court regarding its laws or regulations, even if that representation is inconsistent with how those laws might be interpreted under the principles of our legal system. Cf. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20, 130 S.Ct. 1983 (“Judges must strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture, a tendency that ought not interfere with objective consideration․”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (recognizing, among other things, that the “basic divergence between the national interests of capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social ideologies of those countries that favor state control of a considerable portion of the means of production and those that adhere to a free enterprise system” creates “disagreements as to [the] relevant international legal standards” such that inquiring into the validity of a foreign sovereign's actions is barred by the state action doctrine). Not extending deference in these circumstances disregards and unravels the tradition of according respect to a foreign government's explication of its own laws, the same respect and treatment that we would expect our government to receive in comparable matters before a foreign court. Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 191, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895) (explaining that the rule of reciprocity should “work itself firmly into the structure of our international jurisprudence”); Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int–l B.V., 809 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The declaration of a United States court that the executive branch of the Russian government violated its own law ․ would be an affront to the government of a foreign sovereign.”); Villegas Duran, 534 F.3d at 153 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (explaining that “this Court's practice of giving some deference to a foreign sovereign's view of its own law” and “careful attention” to the interpretation of foreign law is exactly what “we would expect ․ of a [foreign] court” in a reciprocal situation).

2. Applying Deference to the Ministry's Brief

The official statements of the Ministry should be credited and accorded deference. On that basis, we conclude, as Defendants and the Ministry proffer, that Chinese law required Defendants to engage in activities in China that constituted antitrust violations here in the United States.

The 2002 Notice, inter alia, demonstrates that from 2002 to 2005, the relevant time period alleged in the complaint, Chinese law required Defendants to participate in the PVC regime in order to export vitamin C. This regulatory regime allowed vitamin C manufacturers the export only of vitamin C subject to contracts that complied with the “industry–wide negotiated” price. Although the 2002 Notice does not specify how the “industry–wide negotiated” price was set, we defer to the Ministry's reasonable interpretation that the term means what it suggests—that members of the regulated industry were required to negotiate and agree upon a price. It would be nonsensical to incorporate into a government policy the concept of an “industry–wide negotiated” price and require vitamin C manufacturers to comply with that minimum price point if there were no directive to agree upon such a price. Moreover, while on their face the terms “industry self–discipline,” â€œcoordination,” and “voluntary restraint” may suggest that the Defendants were not required to agree to “industry–wide negotiated” prices, we defer to the Ministry's reasonable explanation that these are terms of art within Chinese law connoting the government's expectation that private actors actively self–regulate to achieve the government's policy goals in order to minimize the need for the government to resort to stronger enforcement methods.9 In this context, we find it reasonable to view the entire PVC regime as a decentralized means by which the Ministry, through the Chamber, regulated the export of vitamin C by deferring to the manufacturers and adopting their agreed upon price as the minimum export price. In short, by directing vitamin C manufacturers to coordinate export prices and quantities and adopting those standards into the regulatory regime, the Chinese Government required Defendants to violate the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940) (“[I]t is [ ] well settled that conspiracies under the Sherman Act are not dependent on any overt act other than the act of conspiring.”).

We reiterate that deference in this case is particularly important because of the unique and complex nature of the Chinese legal– and economic–regulatory system and the stark differences between the Chinese system and ours. As the district court recognized, â€œChinese law is not as transparent as that of the United States or other constitutional or parliamentary governments.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d at 559. China's legal system is distinct from ours in that “[r]ather than codifying its statutes, the Chinese government [ ] frequently governs by regulations promulgated by various ministries․ [and] private citizens or companies may be authorized under Chinese regulations to act in certain circumstances as government agents.” Id. Moreover, the danger that “an interpretation suggested by the plain language of a governmental directive may not accurately reflect Chinese law” is all the more plausible where the documents the district court relied upon are translations and use terms of art which are unique to the Chinese system. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d at 542. Deferring to the Ministry's explanation of what is legally required under its system is all the more important where, as here, the record evidence shows a clear disparity between China's economic regulatory regime and our own.

Instead of viewing the ambiguity surrounding China's laws as a reason to defer to the Ministry's reasonable interpretation, the district court, recognizing generally the unique features of China's system, attempted to parse out Defendants' precise legal role within China's complex vitamin C market regulatory framework.10 Noting the discrepancies between China's interpretations of its laws and Plaintiffs' contrary reading of the underlying regulations, the district court determined that, because “[i]t is not clear from the record at this stage of the case whether defendants were performing [a] government function, whether they were acting as private citizens pursuant to governmental directives or whether they were acting as unrestrained private citizens[,]” further inquiry into the voluntariness of Defendants' actions was warranted. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d at 559. Specifically, the district court found problematic the possibility that the “defendants [made] their own choices and then ask[ed] for the government's imprimatur.” Id.

The problems with the district court's approach were threefold. First, it determined that whether Chinese law compelled Defendants' anticompetitive conduct depended in part on whether Defendants petitioned the Chinese Government to approve and sanction such conduct. Second, it relied on evidence that China's price–fixing laws were not enforced to conclude that China's price fixing laws did not exist. And third, it determined that if Chinese law did not compel the exact anticompetitive conduct alleged in the complaint, then there was no true conflict.

Whether Defendants had a hand in the Chinese government's decision to mandate some level of price–fixing is irrelevant to whether Chinese law actually required Defendants to act in a way that violated U.S antitrust laws.11 Moreover, inquiring into the motives behind the Chinese Government's decision to regulate the vitamin C market in the way it did is barred by the act of state doctrine. â€œIn essence, the act of state doctrine is a principle of law designed primarily to avoid judicial inquiry into the acts and conduct of the officials of the foreign state, its affairs and its policies and the underlying reasons and motivations for the actions of the foreign government.” O.N.E. Shipping Ltd., 830 F.2d at 452. The act of state doctrine precludes us from discrediting the Subcommittee or the PVC process as ad hoc protectionist regimes that were intended to provide governmental sanction to an otherwise privately formed cartel. By focusing on the Defendants' role in the regulatory regime, as opposed to the regime itself, the district court erroneously required Defendants to show that the government essentially forced Defendants to price–fix against their will in order to show that there was a true conflict between U.S. antitrust law and Chinese law. This demands too much. It is enough that Chinese law actually mandated such action, regardless of whether Defendants benefited from, complied with, or orchestrated the mandate. Thus, we decline to analyze why China regulated vitamin C in the manner it did and instead focus on what Chinese law required. See id. at 453.

Similarly, inquiring into whether the Chinese Government actually enforced the PVC regime as applied to vitamin C exports confuses the question of what Chinese law required with whether the vitamin C regulations were enforced.12 Plaintiffs argue that because there was extensive evidence that Defendants exported vitamin C without first obtaining the required chop and that Defendants sold vitamin C below the government floor price of $3.35/kg, the Chinese Government did not actually require compliance with the PVC regime. We are disinclined to view this factual evidence of China's unwillingness or inability to enforce the PVC regime as relevant to the PVC regime's legal mandate.

Finally, the district court made a conceptual error about the potential difference between foreign compulsion and a true conflict. The district court credited Plaintiffs' argument that because there was evidence that Defendants routinely agreed to export vitamin C at a price well above the agreed upon price of $3.35/kg, the Defendants alleged anticompetitive conduct was not compelled. But this conclusion misses the mark. Even if Defendants' specific conduct was not compelled by the 2002 Notice, that type of compulsion is not required for us to find a true conflict between the laws of the two sovereigns. It is sufficient “if compliance with the laws of both countries is impossible.” Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799, 113 S.Ct. 2891. Whether Defendants, in fact, charged prices in excess of those mandated by the 2002 Notice does not weigh heavily into our consideration of whether the PVC regime, on its face, required Defendants to violate U.S. antitrust laws in the first instance.

Because we hold that Defendants could not comply with both U.S. antitrust laws and Chinese law regulating the foreign export of vitamin C, a true conflict exists between the applicable laws of China and those of the United States.

D. Applying the Remaining Comity Factors

Having determined that Chinese law required Defendants to violate U.S. antitrust law, we now consider whether the remaining factors weigh in favor of dismissal based on principles of international comity. The district court, both at the motion to dismiss and the summary judgment stages, did not apply the remaining factors because it determined that Chinese law did not require price fixing. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d at 559; In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d at 525–26. We need not remand the case to the district court for consideration of these factors in the first instance because the factors clearly weigh in favor of U.S. courts abstaining from asserting jurisdiction. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (while “[i]t is ordinarily appropriate for us to vacate the judgment of a district court and remand the” case, â€œwhere a record is fully developed and it discloses that, in our judgment, only one possible resolution” of the remaining issue would be permissible “there is no reason to remand”).

The remaining factors in the comity balancing test are: (1) nationality of the parties, locations or principal places of business of corporations; (2) relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (4) existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; (5) possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (6) if relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both countries; (7) whether the court can make its order effective; (8) whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and (9) whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue. Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297–98; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614. Applying the test here, we hold that these remaining factors decidedly weigh in favor of dismissal and counsel against exercising jurisdiction in this case.

All Defendants are Chinese vitamin C manufacturers with their principle places of business in China, and all the relevant conduct at issue took place entirely in China. Although Plaintiffs may be unable to obtain a remedy for Sherman Act violations in another forum, complaints as to China's export policies can adequately be addressed through diplomatic channels and the World Trade Organization's processes. Both the U.S. and China are members of the World Trade Organization and are subject to the same rules on export restrictions. Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendants acted with the express purpose or intent to affect U.S. commerce or harm U.S. businesses in particular. Rather, according to the Ministry, the regulations at issue governing Defendants' conduct were intended to assist China in its transition from a state–run command economy to a market–driven economy, and the resulting price–fixing was intended to ensure China remained a competitive participant in the global vitamin C market and to prevent harm to China's trade relations. While it was reasonably foreseeable that China's vitamin C policies would generally have a negative effect on Plaintiffs as participants in the international market for vitamin C, as noted above, there is no evidence that Defendants' antitrust activities were specifically directed at Plaintiffs or other U.S. companies.

Furthermore, according to the Ministry, the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court has already negatively affected U.S.–China relations. See Joint App'x at 1666, U.S. Vitamin Fine “unfair and inappropriate” Says Mofcom, Global Competition Review, Katy Oglethorpe, March 21, 2013 (quoting the Chinese government as stating that the district court's judgment “will cause problems for the international community and international enterprises, and will eventually harm the interests of the United States due to the increase in international disputes”). The Chinese Government has repeatedly made known to the federal courts, as well as to the United States Department of State in an official diplomatic communication relating to this case, that it considers the lack of deference it received in our courts, and the exercise of jurisdiction over this suit, to be disrespectful and that it “has attached great importance to this case.”13 Doc. No. 111, Diplomatic Correspondence between Embassy for the People's Republic of China and the United States Department of State, April 9, 2014; cf. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (“[W]e have long recognized the demands of comity in suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation.” (emphasis added)).

Currently, the district court's judgment orders Defendants to comply with conflicting legal requirements. This is an untenable outcome. It is unlikely, moreover, that the injunctive relief the Plaintiffs obtained would be enforceable in China. If a similar injunction were issued in China against a U.S. company, prohibiting that company from abiding by U.S. economic regulations, we would undoubtedly decline to enforce that order. See Corporacion Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex–Exploracion Y Produccion, No. 13–4022, 2016 WL 4087215 (2d Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (“[A] final judgment obtained through sound procedures in a foreign country is generally conclusive ․ unless ․ enforcement of the judgment would offend the public policy of the state in which enforcement is sought.” (internal quotation omitted)).

Simply put, the factors weigh in favor of abstention. Recognizing China's strong interest in its protectionist economic policies and given the direct conflict between Chinese policy and our antitrust laws, we conclude that China's “interests outweigh whatever antitrust enforcement interests the United States may have in this case as a matter of law.” O.N.E. Shipping Ltd., 830 F.2d at 450. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain on international comity grounds from asserting jurisdiction, and we reverse the district court's order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss.14

We further note that while we abstain from adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims with respect to the Defendants' conduct, the Plaintiffs are not without recourse to the executive branch, which is best suited to deal with foreign policy, sanctions, treaties, and bi–lateral negotiations. Because we reverse and remand for dismissal on the basis of international comity, we do not address the act of state, foreign sovereign compulsion, or political question defenses.

CONCLUSION

According appropriate deference to the Ministry's official statements to the district court and to this Court on appeal, we hold that Defendants were required by Chinese law to set prices and reduce quantities of vitamin C sold abroad and doing so posed a true conflict between China's regulatory scheme and U.S. antitrust laws such that this conflict in Defendants' legal obligations, balanced with other factors, mandates dismissal of Plaintiffs' suit on international comity grounds. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's judgment entered November 27, 2013, REVERSE the order of November 11, 2008, denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, and REMAND with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.  â€ƒDistrict Judge David D. Trager passed away in January 2011, at which point this case was reassigned to District Judge Brian M. Cogan.

2.  â€ƒBecause we vacate the judgment and reverse the district court's denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss, we do not address the subsequent stages of this litigation nor the related arguments on appeal.

3.  â€ƒWe set forth here only those facts necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. Unless otherwise noted, the facts have been taken from the allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, E.D.N.Y. Dkt. No. 1:06–md–1738, Doc. 179, which we accept as true for purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2011). For a more complete recitation of the facts, see the district court's November 6, 2008 Memorandum and Order. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

4.  â€ƒThe parties explicitly disagree over the nature and authority of this entity. Plaintiffs characterize this entity as an “association” much like a trade association in the United States, while Defendants describe this entity as a government–controlled “Chamber” of producers, unique to China's state–controlled regulatory regime.

5.  â€ƒAs Judge Trager noted, the Ministry's appearance in this case is historic because it is the first time any entity of the Chinese Government has appeared amicus curiae before any U.S. court. On appeal, the Ministry also appears amicus curiae before this Court.

6.  â€ƒIn an annex to its brief to the district court, the Ministry provided the Mitnick Declaration, which contained a copy of all regulations cited by the Ministry. The Ministry noted that all documents were properly authenticated consistent with Rule 902(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs the self–authentication of foreign documents.

7.  â€ƒâ€œUnder § 402 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”), the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct involving foreign trade or commerce, other than import trade or import commerce, unless ‘such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic or import commerce.” Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §â€‚6a(1)(A)) (internal citations omitted).

8.  â€ƒAlthough we adopted the Republic of Indonesia's “reading of the relevant Indonesian law,” we declined to accept fully Indonesia's argument on appeal because it had “not identified any Indonesian statute or regulation” in support of its position. Karaha Bodas, 313 F.3d at 92. To the extent there is no documentary evidence or reference of law proffered to support a foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own laws, deference may be inappropriate.

9.  â€ƒSimilarly, while the documentary evidence shows that when China transitioned from the export quota regime to the PVC regime the role of the Subcommittee within China's regulatory framework changed from a governmental group whose membership was mandatory to a non–governmental trade organization whose membership was voluntary, we again defer to the Ministry's reasonable interpretation that the PVC regime required industry–wide coordination of prices regardless of whether membership in the Subcommittee was required.

10.  â€ƒWe note that if the Chinese Government had not appeared in this litigation, the district court's careful and thorough treatment of the evidence before it in analyzing what Chinese law required at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages would have been entirely appropriate.

11.  â€ƒTo use a domestic example, it would be equally inappropriate for a U.S. court, when analyzing U.S. insurance law, to inquire into the lobbying efforts of U.S. insurance companies for the purposes of determining whether U.S. insurance law applied to those companies.

12.  â€ƒTo use another domestic example, it would be inappropriate for a U.S. court, when analyzing whether U.S. labor laws required factory workers to wear safety masks, to examine evidence of how often factory owners were punished for such violations or how many factory owners actually complied with the safety mask regulations.

13.  â€ƒWe take judicial notice of the diplomatic communication from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the United States State Department dated April 9, 2014. Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp. v. Instituto Mexicano Del Café, 566 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1977). The Ministry's motion as to the diplomatic communication is denied as moot.

14.  â€ƒWe note that it may not be reasonable in all cases to abstain on comity grounds from asserting jurisdiction at the motion to dismiss stage and that a trial court may need the opportunity to consider the countervailing interests and policies on the record that follows discovery. In this case, however, dismissal is appropriate because, after limited discovery, the record before the court at the motion to dismiss stage was sufficient to determine what Chinese law required and whether abstention was appropriate.

Hall, Circuit Judge:

 

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

IN RE: Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation Animal Science Products, Inc., The Ranis Company, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., North China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 13-4791-cvAugust Term, 2014    Decided: September 20, 2016Before: Cabranes, Wesley, and Hall, Circuit Judges.  William A. Isaacson, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Washington, D.C. (James T. Southwick, Shawn L. Raymond, Katherine Kunz, Susman Godfrey LLP, Houston, TX, Michael D. Hausfeld, Brian A. Ratner, Melinda Coolidge, Hausfeld LLP, Washington D.C., Brent W. Landau, Hausfeld LLP, Philadelphia, PA, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.  Jonathan M. Jacobson, (Daniel P. Weick, Justin A. Cohen, on the brief), Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C., New York, NY (Scott A. Sher, Bradley T. Tennis, on the brief), Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati P.C., Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants.

This appeal arises from a multi-district antitrust class action brought against Defendants-Appellants Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical and North China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation, entities incorporated under the laws of China. Plaintiffs-Appellees, Animal Science Products, Inc. and The Ranis Company, Inc., U.S. vitamin C purchasers, allege that Defendants conspired to fix the price and supply of vitamin C sold to U.S. companies on the international market in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §â€‚1, and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§â€‚4, 16. This appeal follows the district court's denial of Defendants' initial motion to dismiss, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Trager, J.), a subsequent denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Cogan, J.),1 and, after a jury trial, entry of judgment awarding Plaintiffs approximately $147 million in damages and enjoining the Defendants from engaging in future anticompetitive behavior. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the district court erred in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss.2

This case presents the question of what laws and standards control when U.S. antitrust laws are violated by foreign companies that claim to be acting at the express direction or mandate of a foreign government. Specifically, we address how a federal court should respond when a foreign government, through its official agencies, appears before that court and represents that it has compelled an action that resulted in the violation of U.S. antitrust laws. In so doing we balance the interests in adjudicating antitrust violations alleged to have harmed those within our jurisdiction with the official acts and interests of a foreign sovereign in respect to economic regulation within its borders. When, as in this instance, we receive from a foreign government an official statement explicating its own laws and regulations, we are bound to extend that explication the deference long accorded such proffers received from foreign governments.

Here, because the Chinese Government filed a formal statement in the district court asserting that Chinese law required Defendants to set prices and reduce quantities of vitamin C sold abroad, and because Defendants could not simultaneously comply with Chinese law and U.S. antitrust laws, the principles of international comity required the district court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case. Thus, we VACATE the judgment, REVERSE the district court's order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, and REMAND with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

BACKGROUND 3

For more than half a century, China has been a leading producer and exporter of vitamin C. In the 1970s, as China began to transition from a centralized state-run command economy to a market economy, the Chinese Government began to implement various export controls in order to retain a competitive edge over other producers of vitamin C on the world market. In the intervening years, the Government continued to influence the market and develop policies to retain that competitive edge. In the 1990s, for example, as a result of a reduction in vitamin C prices, the Government facilitated industry-wide consolidation and implemented regulations to control the prices of vitamin C exports. By 2001, Chinese suppliers had captured 60% of the worldwide vitamin C market.

In 2005, various vitamin C purchasers in the United States, including Plaintiffs Animal Science Products, Inc. and The Ranis Company, filed numerous suits against Defendants, Chinese vitamin C manufacturer Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. and its holding company, North China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation. These cases were transferred to the Eastern District of New York by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. The Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that in December 2001 Defendants and their co–conspirators established an illegal cartel with the “purpose and effect of fixing prices, controlling the support of vitamin C to be exported to the United States and worldwide, and committing unlawful practices designed to inflate the prices of vitamin C sold to plaintiffs and other purchasers in the United States and elsewhere.” E.D.N.Y. Dkt. No. 1:06–md–1738, Doc. 179 (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)) ¶â€‰1. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants colluded with an entity that has been referred to in this litigation as both the “Western Medicine Department of the Association of Importers and Exporters of Medicines and Health Products of China” and the “China Chamber of Commerce of Medicines & Health Products Importers & Exporters,” (the “Chamber”)4 and agreed to “restrict their exports of Vitamin C in order to create a shortage of supply in the international market.” Id. ¶â€‰49. Plaintiffs allege that, from December 2001 to the time the complaint was filed, Defendants, their representatives, and the Chamber devised and implemented policies to address price cutting by market actors and to limit production levels and increase vitamin C prices with the intent to create a shortage on the world market and maintain China's position as a leading exporter. Id. ¶â€‰60.

Rather than deny the Plaintiffs' allegations, Defendants instead moved to dismiss on the basis that they acted pursuant to Chinese regulations regarding vitamin C export pricing and were, in essence, required by the Chinese Government, specifically the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (the â€œMinistry”), to coordinate prices and create a supply shortage. Defendants argued that the district court should dismiss the complaint pursuant to the act of state doctrine, the doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion, and/or principles of international comity. In an historic act, the Ministry filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss.5

In its brief to the district court, the Ministry represented that it is the highest authority within the Chinese Government authorized to regulate foreign trade. The Ministry explained that the Chamber, which Plaintiffs refer to as an “association,” is entirely unlike a “trade association” or the “chamber of commerce” in the United States and, consistent with China's state–run economy, is a “Ministry–supervised entity authorized by the Ministry to regulate vitamin C export prices and output levels.” Joint App'x at 153. The Ministry's amicus brief describes the Chamber as follows:

To meet the need of building the socialist market economy and deepening the reform of foreign economic and trade management system, the China Chamber of Commerce of Medicines & Health Products Importers & Exporters was established in May 1989 in an effort to boost the sound development of foreign trade in medicinal products. As a social body formed along business lines and enjoying the status of legal person, the Chamber is composed of economic entities registered in the People's Republic of China dealing in medicinal items as authorized by the departments under the [S]tate Council responsible for foreign economic relations and trade as well as organizations empowered by them. It is designated to coordinate import and export business in Chinese and Western medicines and provide service for its member enterprises. Its over 1100 members are scattered all over China. The Chamber abides by the state laws and administrative statutes, implements its policies and regulations governing foreign trade, accepts the guidance and supervision of the responsible departments under the States Council. The very purpose is to coordinate and supervise the import and export operations in this business, to maintain business order and protect fair competition, to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the state, the trade and the members and to promote the sound development of foreign trade in medicinal items.

Joint App'x at 157 n.10 (emphasis in original). According to the Ministry, the Chamber was an instrumentality of the State that was required to implement the Ministry's administrative rules and regulations with respect to the vitamin C trade.6

In support of Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Ministry also provided evidence of two Ministry–backed efforts by the Chamber to regulate the vitamin C industry: (1) a vitamin C Subcommittee (“the Subcommittee”) created in 1997 and (2) a “price verification and chop” policy (“PVC”) implemented in 2002. The Chamber created the Subcommittee to address “intense competition and challenges from the international [vitamin C] market.” Joint App'x at 159. Before 2002, only companies that were members of the Subcommittee were allowed to export vitamin C. Under this regime, a vitamin C manufacturer qualified for the Subcommittee and was granted an “export quota license” if its export price and volume was in compliance with the Subcommittee's coordinated export price and export quota. In short, the Ministry explained to the district court that it compelled the Subcommittee and its licensed members to set and coordinate vitamin C prices and export volumes.

In 2002, the Chamber abandoned the “export quota license” regime and implemented the PVC system, which the Ministry represented was in place during the time of the antitrust violations alleged in this case. To announce the new regime, the Ministry issued an official notice, a copy of which is attached to the Ministry's brief in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss. This document, hereinafter “the 2002 Notice,” explains that the Ministry adopted the PVC regime, among other reasons, â€œin order to accommodate the new situations since China's entry into [the World Trade Organization], maintain the order of market competition, make active efforts to avoid anti–dumping sanctions imposed by foreign countries on China's exports, promote industry self–discipline and facilitate the healthy development of exports.” Special App'x 301. The 2002 Notice, furthermore, refers to “industry–wide negotiated prices” and states that “PVC procedure shall be convenient for exporters while it is conducive for the chambers to coordinate export price and industry self–discipline.” Special App'x 302. According to the Ministry, under this system, vitamin C manufacturers were required to submit documentation to the Chamber indicating both the amount and price of vitamin C it intended to export. The Chamber would then “verify” the contract price and affix a “chop,” i.e., a special seal, to the contract, which signaled that the contract had been reviewed and approved by the Chamber. A contract received a chop only if the price of the contract was “at or above the minimum acceptable price set by coordination through the Chamber.” Joint App'x 164. Manufacturers could only export vitamin C if their contracts contained this seal. The Ministry asserted that under the PVC regime, Defendants were required to coordinate with other vitamin C manufacturers and agree on the price that the Chamber would use in the PVC regime. In short, the Ministry represented to the district court that all of the vitamin C that was legally exported during the relevant time was required to be sold at industry–wide coordinated prices.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the act of state doctrine, the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion, and the principle of international comity. The district court (Trager, J.) denied the motion in order to allow for further discovery with respect to whether Defendants' assertion that the actions constituting the basis of the antitrust violations were compelled by the Chinese Government. In the district court's view, the factual record was “simply too ambiguous to foreclose further inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants' actions.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F.Supp.2d at 559.

After further discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting the same three defenses that were the basis for their motion to dismiss. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d at 525–26. The district court (Cogan, J.) considered the evidence submitted by Defendants and the Ministry and accepted the Ministry's explanation as to its relationship with the Chamber, but “decline[d] to defer to the Ministry's interpretation of Chinese law” because the Ministry failed “to address critical provisions” of the PVC regime that “undermine[d] [the Ministry's] interpretation of Chinese law.” Id. at 551. The district court further reasoned that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 (“Rule 44.1”), when interpreting Chinese law it had “substantial discretion to consider different types of evidence” beyond the Ministry's official statements, including, for example, the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witness, a scholar of Chinese law. Id. at 561. The district court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment because it determined that “Chinese law did not compel Defendants' anticompetitive conduct” in any of the relevant time periods. Id. at 567.

The case ultimately went to trial. In March 2013, a jury found Defendants liable for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court awarded Plaintiffs approximately $147 million in damages and issued a permanent injunction barring Defendants from further violating the Sherman Act. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The central issue that we address is whether principles of international comity required the district court to dismiss the suit. As part of our comity analysis we must determine whether Chinese law required Defendants to engage in anticompetitive conduct that violated U.S. antitrust laws. Within that inquiry, we examine the appropriate level of deference to be afforded a foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own laws. We hold that the district court abused its discretion by not abstaining, on international comity grounds, from asserting jurisdiction because the court erred by concluding that Chinese law did not require Defendants to violate U.S. antitrust law and further erred by not extending adequate deference to the Chinese Government's proffer of the interpretation of its own laws.

A. Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss on international comity grounds. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, 412 F.3d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 2005). An abuse of discretion “occurs when (1) the court's decision rests on an error of law or clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., 814 F.3d 91, 104 (2d Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation omitted). The determination of foreign law is “a question of law, which is subject to de novo review.” Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (“Pertamina”), 313 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). In determining foreign law, â€œwe may consider any relevant material or source, including the legal authorities supplied by the parties on appeal as well as those authorities presented to the district court below.” Carlisle Ventures, Inc. v. Banco Espanol de Credito, S.A., 176 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1999); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.

B. International Comity

Defendants argue that the district court erred by not dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint on international comity grounds. Comity is both a principle guiding relations between foreign governments and a legal doctrine by which U.S. courts recognize an individual's acts under foreign law. See In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1046 (2d Cir. 1996). â€œComity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895) (internal quotations omitted). â€œ[I]t is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Id. This doctrine “is not just a vague political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our interest to do so [but r]ather it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.” Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court of S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987). While we approach Defendants' international comity defense from the “legal sense,” we do not lose sight of the broader principles underlying the doctrine. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, 412 F.3d at 423 (“Whatever its precise contours, international comity is clearly concerned with maintaining amicable working relationships between nations, a shorthand for good neighbourliness, common courtesy and mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining judicial vineyards.” (internal quotation omitted)). Our analysis reflects an obligation to balance “the interests of the United States, the interests of the foreign state, and those mutual interests the family of nations have in just and efficiently functioning rules of international law.” In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d at 1048.

The principles of comity implicate a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction. O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1987). Defendants do not dispute that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) (collecting cases) (“[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”); rather, Defendants argue that principles of international comity required the district court to abstain from exercising that jurisdiction here, see O.N.E. Shipping Ltd., 830 F.2d at 452 (“Congress left it to the courts to decide when to employ notions of abstention from exercising jurisdiction in extraterritorial antitrust cases.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 97–686, at 13 (1982) (“If a court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, [the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 7 ] would have no effect on the court['s] ability to employ notions of comity ․ or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transaction.”).

To determine whether to abstain from asserting jurisdiction on comity grounds we apply the multi–factor balancing test set out in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614–15 (9th Cir. 1976) and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979). See O.N.E. Shipping Ltd., 830 F.2d at 451–52 (noting that “[t]he comity balancing test has been explicitly used in this Court”). Both Timberlane Lumber and Mannington Mills addressed the unique international concerns that are implicated by exercising jurisdiction over antitrust violations that occur abroad and that involve the laws and regulations of a foreign nation. See Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 613 (“[T]here is the additional question which is unique to the international setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United States including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce are sufficiently strong, vis–a–vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”); Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1296 (“When foreign nations are involved, however, it is unwise to ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction.”). Combined and summarized here, the enumerated factors from Timberlane Lumber and Mannington Mills (collectively the “comity balancing test”) guiding our analysis of whether to dismiss on international comity grounds include: (1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) Nationality of the parties, locations or principal places of business of corporations; (3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here as compared with conduct abroad; (4) The extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; (6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both countries; (8) Whether the court can make its order effective; (9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and (10) Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue. Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297–98; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614.

Since our adoption of the comity balancing test, the Supreme Court, in determining whether international comity cautioned against exercising jurisdiction over antitrust claims premised entirely on foreign conduct, relied solely upon the first factor—the degree of conflict between U.S. and foreign law—to decide that abstention was inappropriate. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (“The only substantial question in this litigation is whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.” (internal quotation omitted)). The Court explained that just because “conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws.” Id. Thus, in that case, the degree of conflict between the laws of the two states had to rise to the level of a true conflict, i.e. â€œcompliance with the laws of both countries [must have been] impossible,” to justify the Court's abstention on comity grounds. Id. at 799, 113 S.Ct. 2891. In other words, â€œ[n]o conflict exists ․ â€˜where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403, cmt. e). After determining that there was not a true conflict, the Court reflected that there was “no need in this litigation to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on the ground of international comity.” Id.

We read Hartford Fire narrowly and interpret the modifying phrase “in this litigation” in reference to the “other considerations that might inform a decision” as suggesting that the remaining factors in the comity balancing test are still relevant to an abstention analysis. Id.; see Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 600 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Since the majority did not address the ‘other considerations' bearing on comity, the Court's Hartford Fire analysis ‘left unclear whether it was saying that the only relevant comity factor in that case was conflict with foreign law ․ or whether the Court was more broadly rejecting balancing of comity interests in any case where there is no true conflict.’ ” (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Litigation in United States Courts 80 (2008))). That a true conflict was lacking in Hartford Fire does not, in the inverse, lead us to conclude that the presence of such a conflict alone is sufficient to require dismissal and thereby vitiate the need to consider the remaining factors.

Some courts, after Hartford Fire, have gone further and do not require a true conflict between laws before applying the remaining factors in the comity balancing test. See, e.g., Mujica, 771 F.3d at 600 (“We think that Hartford Fire does not require proof of a ‘true conflict’ as a prerequisite for invoking the doctrine of comity, at least in a case involving adjudicatory comity.”); Freund v. Rep. of Fr., 592 F.Supp.2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In post–Hartford Fire cases, conflict analysis has not been rigidly invoked to preclude consideration of the full range of principles relating to international comity.” (citation omitted)). Similarly, we have not required a true conflict where a party does not invoke a prescriptive comity defense, â€œthat is, where a party [does not] claim[ ] that it is subject to conflicting regulatory schemes,” as Defendants do here. Mujica, 771 F.3d at 600; see Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he only issue of international comity properly raised here is whether adjudication of this case by a United States court would offend ‘amicable working relationships' with Egypt.” (citation omitted)). We need not, however, determine whether absent a true conflict, the district court could have abstained from asserting jurisdiction on comity grounds because, in our view and as explained below, there is a true conflict between U.S. law and Chinese law in this case.

C. True Conflict Analysis

To determine whether Defendants could have sold and distributed vitamin C while in compliance with both Chinese and U.S. law, and thus whether a “true conflict” exists, we must determine conclusively what the law of each country requires.

The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. While this language has been interpreted to outlaw only unreasonable restraints in trade, see, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997), certain types of anticompetitive conduct are “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality,” Nat. Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978). â€œPrice–fixing agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price–fixing agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 164 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Thus, if Chinese law required Defendants to enter into horizontal price–fixing agreements, â€œcompliance with the laws of both countries is [ ] impossible,” Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799, 113 S.Ct. 2891, and there is a true conflict.

The Ministry, as amicus, has proclaimed on behalf of the Chinese Government that Chinese law, specifically the PVC regime during the relevant period, required Defendants, as manufacturers of vitamin C, to fix the price and quantity of vitamin C sold abroad. The Ministry mainly relies on the reference to “industry–wide negotiated prices” contained in the 2002 Notice to support its position. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the Ministry's statements are not conclusive and that because the 2002 Notice does not explicitly mandate price fixing, adherence to both Chinese law and U.S. antitrust law is possible. Our interpretation of the record as to Chinese law thus hinges on the amount of deference that we extend to the Chinese Government's explanation of its own laws.

 

 

I should go get a life.